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FOREWORD 
At the direction of then Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air Force 
Institute of Technology established the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFCSE) at its 
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, campus in 2002. With academic oversight by a Subcommittee on 
Systems Engineering (SE), chaired by Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Levis, the AFCSE was 
tasked to develop case studies of SE implementation during concept definition, acquisition, and 
sustainment. The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning objectives, and suggested 
the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) is increasing the acquisition of joint complex systems that 
deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighters. SE is the technical and technical 
management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, 
affordable solutions. The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the need to mature a sound 
systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. Gaining an understanding of the past and 
distilling learning principles that are then shared with others through our formal education and 
practitioner support are critical to achieving continuous improvement. 
The Air Force CSE has published nine case studies thus far including (1) the C-5A, (2) the F-
111, (3) the Hubble Telescope, (4) the Theater Battle Management Core System, (5) the B-2, (6) 
the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, (7) the A-10, (8) the Global Positioning System and 
(9) the Peacekeeper ICBM. All case studies are available on the Air Force CSE web site 
[http://www.afit.edu/cse]. These case studies support academic instruction on SE within military 
service academies, civilian and military graduate schools, industry continuing education 
programs, and those practicing SE in the field. Each of the case studies is comprised of elements 
of success as well as examples of SE decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal. Both types of 
examples are useful for learning.  
Along with discovering historical facts, we have conducted key interviews with program 
managers and chief engineers, both within the Government and those working for the various 
prime and subcontractors. From this information, we have concluded that the discipline needed 
to implement SE and the political and acquisition environment surrounding programs continue to 
challenge our ability to provide balanced technical solutions. We look forward to your comments 
on this KC-135 Flight Simulator case study and our other AFCSE published studies. 
 
 
 
GEORGE E. MOONEY, SES  
Director, AF Center for Systems Engineering  
Air Force Institute of Technology  
http://www.afit.edu/cse 
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1. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES  
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process  
1.1.1 Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver 
needed capabilities to the warfighters. With a constant objective to improve and mature the 
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these 
technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering (SE) process, focused explicitly on 
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of 
customers and stakeholders must continue to evolve and mature. SE is the technical and 
technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that exhibit the best 
balance of cost and performance. The process must operate effectively with desired mission-
level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the lowest level of 
the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost and schedule 
constraints. The SE process changes as the program progresses from one phase to the next, as do 
the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the decades, maturing, expanding, 
growing, and evolving from the base established during the conduct of past programs. SE has a 
long history. Examples (e.g. case studies) can be found demonstrating a systemic application of 
effective engineering and engineering management, as well as poorly applied, but well-defined 
processes. Throughout the many decades during which SE has emerged as a discipline, many 
practices, processes, heuristics, and tools have been developed, documented, and applied.  
Several core life-cycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging during 
any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements. Secondly, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the 
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components. And third, 
the system requirements need to be stable, balanced, and must properly reflect all activities in all 
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. For example; as 
the system design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively 
expensive to satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or 
modifying the requirements or set of requirements. 
SE includes making key system and design trades early in the process to establish the system 
architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy system, 
modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level behavior and 
performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and assess 
architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows the 
functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive, or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs. 
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas.  
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical architectural 
designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is applied to 
subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems (SoS). Once a solution 
is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification takes place to ensure 
satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and 
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measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes place 
well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
There are several excellent representations of the SE process presented in the literature. These 
depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of the systems 
engineering process. One can find SE process definitions, guides, and handbooks from the 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), Electronics Industrial Association 
(EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and various DoD agencies and 
organizations. They show the process as it should be applied by today‘s experienced practitioner. 
One of these processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted by 
Figure 1. It should be noted that this model is not accomplished in a single pass. This iterative 
and nested process gets repeated to the lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces. 
 
Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as presented by the  
Defense Acquisition University. 
1.1.2 Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades and has expanded 
and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly complex 
internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop aircraft and other 
weapons of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the practitioners 
and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. However, the cost and schedule 
performance records of the past programs are fraught with examples of both well-managed 
programs and programs with less than stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 
1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and running behind 
schedule. The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and more 
geographically and culturally distributed. The SE process, as applied within the confines of a 
single system or a single company, was no longer the norm. 
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Today, many factors overshadow new acquisitions; including SoS context, network-centric 
warfare and operations, and the rapid growth in information technology (IT). These factors have 
driven a new form of emergent SE, which focuses on certain aspects of our current process. One 
of these increased areas of focus resides in the architectural definitions used during system 
analysis. This process is differentiated by greater reliance on reusable, architectural views 
describing the system context and concept of operations, interoperability, information and data 
flows and network service-oriented characteristics. The DoD has recently made these 
architectural products, described in the DoD Architectural Framework v.2.0 (DoDAF), 
mandatory to enforce this new architecture-driven systems engineering process throughout the 
acquisition life cycle. 
1.1.3 Case Studies 
The SE process to be used in today‘s complex SoS projects is a process matured and founded on 
the principles of systems developed in the past. The examples of SE used in other programs, both 
past and present; provide a wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today‘s 
process. 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of SE principles. Case 
studies facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term consequences of the SE 
and programmatic decisions on program success. The systems engineering case studies assist in 
discussion of both successful and unsuccessful methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and 
decision material to assess the outcome of alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, 
the importance of using skills from multiple professions and engineering disciplines and 
collecting, assessing, and integrating varied functional data is emphasized. Analysis of these 
aspects will provide the student with real-world, detailed examples of how the process plays a 
significant role in balancing cost, schedule, and performance. 
The utilization and misutilization of SE principles are highlighted, with special emphasis on the 
conditions that foster and impede good SE practices. Case studies should be used to illustrate 
both good and bad examples of acquisition management and learning principles, to include 
determining whether: 
 Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer; 
 Effective requirements analysis was applied; 
 Consistent and rigorous application of SE management standards was applied; 
 Effective test planning was accomplished; 
 Effective major technical program reviews were conducted; 
 Continuous risk assessments and management were implemented; 
 Reliable cost estimates and policies were developed; 
 Disciplined application of configuration management was demonstrated; 
 A well-defined system boundary was established; 
  Disciplined methodologies were developed for complex systems; and 
 Problem-solving methods incorporated understanding of the system within the bigger 
environment (customer‘s customer). 
A key tenet of the SE process is to transform an operational need into a set of verifiable system 
elements. These system elements are allocated and translated by the SE process into detailed 
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requirements. The SE process, from the identification of the need to the development and 
utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and optimize system and subsystem 
performance within cost and schedule to provide an operationally effective system throughout its 
life cycle. Case studies highlight the various interfaces and communications to achieve this 
optimization, which include: 
 The program manager/SE interface, which is essential between the operational user and 
developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance requirements for the system 
and subsystems. 
 The government/contractor interface, essential for the practice of SE to translate and allocate 
the performance requirements into detailed requirements. 
 The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the SE practice of 
integration and balance. 
The SE process must manage risk, known and unknown, as well as internal and external. This 
objective specifically focuses on external factors and the impact of uncontrollable influences, 
such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new instructions/policies, changing 
stakeholders or user requirements or contractor and government staffing levels. 
Lastly, the SE process must respond to mega-trends in the SE discipline itself, as the nature of 
SE and related practices vary with time. 
1.1.4 Framework for Analysis 
This case study is presented in a format that follows the learning principles specifically derived 
for the program, utilizing the Friedman-Sage framework to organize the assessment of the 
application of the SE process. The framework and the derived matrix can play an important role 
in developing case studies in SE and systems management, especially case studies that involve 
systems acquisition. The framework presents a nine row by three column matrix (Figure 2). 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared 
Responsibility 
3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and Management    
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design    
C. System and Subsystem Detailed Design and 
Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface Integration    
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post Deployment    
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and management    
I. System and Program management    
Figure 2. Friedman- Sage Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities. 
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Figure 2 represent phases in the systems engineering life 
cycle:  
 Requirements Definition and Management  
 Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design  
KC-135 Simulator Systems Engineering Case Study   
 
ID 8845 Page 5 
 
 Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation  
 Systems and Interface Integration  
 Validation and Verification  
 System Deployment and Post Deployment  
Three of the concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support:  
 Life-Cycle Support  
 Risk Assessment and Management  
 System and Program Management  
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman-Sage framework suggests these 
nine are the most relevant to SE in that they cover the essential life-cycle processes in systems 
acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the process. Most other 
concept areas identified during the development of the matrix appear to be subsets of one of 
these areas. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent the responsibilities 
and perspectives of Government and Contractor, and the shared responsibilities between the 
Government and the Contractor.  
The Friedman-Sage matrix is not a unique SE applications tool, but rather a disciplined approach 
to evaluate the SE process, tools, and procedures as applied to a program. It is based on two 
major premises as the founding objectives:  
1. In teaching SE, case studies can be instructive in that they relate aspects of the real world to 
the student to provide valuable program experience and professional practice to academic 
theory.  
2. In teaching SE in DoD, there has previously been little distinction between duties and 
responsibilities of the Government and industry activities. More often than not, the 
Government‘s role in SE is the role of the requirements developer.  
1.2 KC-135 ATS Major Learning Principles and Friedman-Sage Matrix  
The authors‘ selection of learning principles and Friedman-Sage matrix are reflected in the 
Executive Summary of this case (separate attachment).  
2. The KC-135 System Description 
2.1 KC-135 Aircraft Overview 
The KC-135 is a short-to-medium range tanker aircraft. First flight occurred in August 1956 with 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) occurring in June 1957 at Castle AFB, California. A total of 
732 aircraft were produced and are operated by Air Education and Training Command (AETC), 
Air Mobility Command (AMC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), United States Air Forces Europe 
(USAFE), Air national Guard (ANG), and the Air Force Reserve (AFRC). In addition to 
supporting USAF aircraft the KC-135 fleet also supports the United Sates Navy (USN), United 
States Marine Corps (USMC), and allied aircraft. 
The mainstay of the USAF tanker fleet, the long serving KC-135 is similar in size to the 
commercial Boeing 707 but was designed to military specifications incorporating different 
structural details and materials. The KC-135 fuel tanks are located in the aircraft‘s ―wet wings‖ 
and below the floor in the fuselage.  
KC-135 Simulator Systems Engineering Case Study   
 
ID 8845 Page 6 
 
The original KC-135A powered by J57 turbojets has since been modified to other versions. A 
major re-engine program upgraded USAF, AFRC, and ANG KC-135As to KC-135Es with JT3D 
turbofans and related components removed from surplus commercial 707s. Fuel carrying 
capacity was increased by 20 percent. The KC-135E in service with the ANG represents some of 
the oldest aircraft in the USAF inventory. USAF planned on retiring all E models by 2008 but 
status remains uncertain at the time this report was written. 
Re-engined KC-135A/Es with F-108 turbofans are designated KC-135 R/Ts. The first KC-135R 
flight was in October 1982 and deliveries began in July 1984. They embody modifications to 25 
major systems and subsystems and not only carry more fuel farther but have reduced 
maintenance costs, are able to use shorter runways, and meet stringent noise abatement 
requirements. Additional modifications extend the capability and operational utility of the KC-
135 well into the 21st century. The Pacer Compass Radar and Global Positioning System 
(CRAG) avionics modernization program, completed in 2002, installed a new compass, radar, 
and GPS navigation system, a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS), and new 
digital multifunctional cockpit displays. Pacer CRAG Block 40 capabilities initiated in 2003 
meet global air traffic management (GATM) standards ensuring the KC-135 unrestricted access 
to global air routes. Forty KC-135R/T aircraft are also outfitted with the capability to relay LINK 
16 tactical information beyond line of sight of other aircraft.  
Currently the KC-135 Total Active Inventory (TAI) is comprised of approximately 450 aircraft. 
Included in the TAI, the KC-135T aircraft (formerly KC-135Q), which were capable of refueling 
the now-retired SR-71s, still retain the capability to carry different fuels in the wing and body 
tanks. Eight KC-135Rs are air refuelable while 20 R models have wing-mounted refueling pods 
for enhanced refueling of USN and NATO aircraft. 
2.2 KC-135 Aircrew Training System (ATS) Overview  
2.2.1 KC-135 ATS Mission  
The principal function of the KC-135 ATS is to instruct pilots, copilots, and boom operators on 
the procedures and techniques required to safely and effectively operate the KC-135 aircraft 
thereby ensuring the air refueling needs of USAF bomber, fighter, cargo, and reconnaissance 
aircraft are met. Through use of the ground-based simulator, knowledge and proficiency is 
gained in the operational use of all controls and instruments during takeoff, landing, transition, 
instrument flight, tactical missions, formation flight, and emergency procedures.  
2.2.2 KC-135 ATS Historical Background - Pre 1992 
The KC-135 simulator started life in the early 1960s as a Cockpit Procedures Trainer (CPT), 
Mission Design Series MB-26, with the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Training was aimed 
chiefly at ensuring proficiency on emergency procedures, especially landing and takeoff 
emergencies, and to conduct instrument training. Because of the number of SAC bases located 
across the country the user approached training with a unique concept. SAC would provide 
schoolhouse training at the 93
rd
 Bomb Wing Combat Crew Training School at Castle AFB, 
California with three simulators, provide seven simulators at other fixed sites, and service other 
operational sites with nine mobile simulators.  
The mobile KC-135 simulators were housed in railroad cars that could be transferred around the 
country to provide required cockpit procedures training. One such KC-135 mobile simulator, 
shown in Figures 3 and 4, was moved on a routine route that included Barksdale AFB (Bossier 
City, Louisiana), Dyess AFB (Abilene, Texas), Columbus AFB (Columbus, Mississippi), and 
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Carswell AFB (Fort Worth, Texas). Another unique feature of this simulator was the use of a 
crude visual display which incorporated an opaque windscreen that had lights behind it that 
would flash simulating lightning. The instructor, utilizing an Instructor Operator Station (IOS) 
was able to simulate system problems and weather but any true visual cues to the outside world 
were lacking. 
1
 
 
Figure 3. KC-135A Instrument Flight Trainer Railroad Car.2 
 
 
Figure 4. KC-135A Instrument Flight Trainer Railroad Car.3 
                                                 
1
 Info from Simulator Technician Jeff Beish website 
2
 Photo from Wildfire Productions 
3
 Info from Simulator Technician Jeff Beish website 
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SAC saw a need for increased simulator realism to not only provide better training and improve 
crew coordination but to decrease on-aircraft flight time because of rising fuel costs in the late 
1970s. Advances in simulator technologies in the latter 1970s also enabled this possibility.  
At the same time the Air Force Simulator System Program Office (SIMSPO) at Wright-Patterson 
AFB decided to implement an acquisition strategy to encourage competition among simulator 
manufacturers in new acquisitions. Initial candidates for this policy included two weapon system 
trainer complexes for the B-52 and KC-135 aircraft. Competition was further enhanced through 
the use of a preliminary design review process that promised to result in acquisition and life-
cycle cost savings. Following this preliminary design review competition one company would be 
selected. On May 1, 1980, the winner of this competition was Singer-Link Company. The goal 
was to equip each base that had a B-52 WST with a KC-135 WST that had complete flight and 
navigation stations. The first complex was ready for training at Castle AFB, California, in late 
1981. This Weapon System Trainer (WST) complex offered a sophisticated and integrated 
training system. In the end, the B-52 WST went into production and because of funding 
limitations the KC-135 WST did not. 
Since funding for new KC-135 trainers was not available, it was decided to approach this need 
from another direction and funding was procured to award the refurbishment/enhancement of the 
existing MB-26 KC-135 Instrument Flight Simulators in 1985. These KC-135A/R simulator 
trainers were designated as A/F 37A-T87, -T88 respectively. This contract was competed and 
won by Boeing Co., Huntsville, Alabama. Redifussion of the United Kingdom was selected as 
the visual system subcontractor. These refurbished trainers referred to as Operational Flight 
Trainers would have fully operational cockpits with state-of-the-art visual systems (dusk and 
night only with no daytime capability) and a flight instructor station. While the original 
requirements did not require a motion system, the system platforms were in fact, designed to 
accommodate a motion system in the future. Although the details of how this decision was made 
have been lost, designing the platform to be compatible with a motion system paid dividends 
later in the system‘s lifecycle by providing a growth path which facilitated the implementation of 
future upgrades. 
2.2.3 Training System Evolution in Capabilities 
The complexity, costs, and operating environment of modern aircraft has resulted in a broader 
use of advanced simulation for crew training within the USAF. Simulators can provide more in-
depth training than can be accomplished in airplanes and provide a very high transfer of learning 
and behavior from the simulator to the airplane. The use of simulators, in lieu of airplanes, has 
resulted in safer flight training and cost reductions for the operators as well as improved fuel 
conservation and reduction in adverse environmental effects. 
In order to realize the goal of increased usage of the ATS for KC-135 crew training, a cultural 
change was needed within the Air Force in that effective training could be achieved by effective 
use of ground-based trainers. Money had to be allocated to effectively operate, maintain, and 
upgrade ATS capabilities; and corresponding improvements to the hardware and software had to 
be realized in a cost-effective manner.  
Against this backdrop, larger policy issues within the DoD were being played out across various 
systems development and sustainment strategies. Then Secretary of Defense William Perry had 
recently cancelled all Military Specifications and Standards concluding that reliance upon 
commercial standards and emerging marketplace trends would sustain DoD capabilities and 
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ensure the Department‘s ability to stay on the cutting edge of technology and commercial best 
practices. The implementation of this policy, however, was not as smooth as expected. Impacts 
to the KC-135 simulators were not anticipated, but remained uncertain regarding future 
consequences. 
Beginning in 1992, Air Mobility Command (AMC), under their commander General Fogleman, 
began an extensive upgrade of its simulators.
4
 The goal of the approximately $300M program 
was to upgrade the command‘s simulators to the equivalent of FAA Level C (a standard used by 
the commercial airline industry for training flight crews). AMC offered to trade in flying hours in 
exchange for funding to upgrade its flight simulator fleet. The agreement, which AMC worked 
with the Air Staff, called for AMC to fund 60 percent of the cost of the upgrades (to be funded 
with flying hour reductions) with the Air Staff funding the remaining 40 percent. One reason the 
Command believed this was a reasonable approach is because the commercial airline industry 
had successfully migrated a majority of its training to flight simulators in the past decade 
resulting in significant cost savings to the airlines. The KC-135 simulator upgrade program 
which was initiated in 1992 addressed four major areas of the KC-135 OFTs: computer systems, 
aerodynamic models, motion, and visual systems.
5
 
2.2.4 KC-135 ATS Key System Capabilities Post 1992 
The KC-135 ATS provides for initial qualification, re-qualification, upgrade training, difference 
training, conversion training, the central flight instructor course, and selected continuation 
training to pilots, boom operators, and instructors. Currently, in order to qualify as a new KC-
135 aircrew member, students typically go through a year of Undergraduate Pilot Training in 
either the T-1 or T-38. Tanker candidates then go to Altus AFB for initial qualification training 
at the schoolhouse. Upon graduation they leave Altus AFB as both pilot and co-pilot qualified. 
Although still considered co-pilots once they reach their initial unit, the level of training they 
received at the schoolhouse facilitates their upgrade training. At this point they undergo 
continuation training using Operational Flight Trainers (OFTs) and other training system media/ 
courseware located on site. With over 3,000 crewmembers located in 50+ Squadrons at 38 
locations worldwide, the KC-135 ATS is considered by AMC to arguably be the Air Forces‘ 
largest aircrew training program. 
The KC-135 ATS OFTs are geared toward accurately duplicating the movements of a KC-135 in 
flight. In addition to meeting formal training requirements the system enables aircrews to 
practice emergency-avoidance maneuvers in a safe and controlled environment. Flight 
instructors use computer-based programs within the simulators to imitate a wide variety of 
potentially-dangerous scenarios, such as engine fires, hydraulic and electrical malfunctions, to 
test the aircrews‘ abilities to react appropriately. Instructors can also simulate actual flight lines, 
surrounding terrain/features, and realistic atmospheric conditions of almost any base or airfield 
in the world. This allows pilots to practice instrument approaches and departures they would use 
                                                 
4
 AMC Website Orange Book Info 
5
 These planned upgrades have realized significant savings to AMC. It costs about $5,000 an hour to operate the 
KC-135 versus about $500 an hour to operate the KC-135 simulator. In a normal four-hour mission, the Air Force is 
saving approximately $38,000. To illustrate the potential for savings, a series of planned upgrades to the KC-135 
schoolhouse at Altus AFB for undergraduate pilot training have resulted in increased ground-based simulator 
training from 16 to 24 missions including instrument and qualification evaluation, while reducing the requirement 
for in-flight training at the schoolhouse from 10 flights to just four. The addition of a third simulator at the 
McConnell Aircrew Training Facility is expected to increase aircrew training missions from more than 750 per year 
to more than 1,200 per year. 
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at these different locations before actually visiting those places. If a student or crew member 
does not handle the situation properly the first time, the instructors have the capability to 
duplicate and/or repeat the scenario and train them to a proficiency level where, if these things 
do occur in the airplane, they will be ready to handle them.  
2.2.5 KC-135 ATS System Description – Post 1992 
The current KC-135 Aircrew Training System consists of 19 KC-135R model Operational Flight 
Trainers (OFTs), two Boom Operator Part Task Trainers (BOPTT), one KC-135E Weapon 
System Trainer (WST), 27 Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) Interactive Hand Controller 
(IHC) Part Task Trainers (GIPTTs), eight Cockpit Familiarization Trainers (CFT), one Navigator 
Trainer, 258 Desktop Computer Based Training Workstations (CBT), 16 Pacer CRAG Table-
Top Trainers, one Cargo Loading Trainer (CLT), 40 Air Force Mission Support System 
(AFMSS) Computers, and 112 CBT portable laptop computers. 
Each of the OFTs that comprise the most significant element of the overall ATS is a full-sized, 
mechanical replica of a KC-135 cockpit that offers aircrews a virtual-reality flying experience. 
The windows, which line the front and sides of the mock cockpits, are actually visual system 
computer-generated screens that display genuine flight lines, simulate realistic scenery as well as 
weather conditions and other aircraft both tankers and receivers. 
The OFT is a fully replicated and functional cockpit trainer with a visual system capable of 
meeting FAA level C certification, see Figure 5. All 19 OFTs are equipped with a full six-Degree 
of Freedom motion system. The OFTs are located both in CONUS and overseas with one each at 
Mildenhall, UK and Kadena, Korea. (Appendix C) 
The single WST, which was never a part of the simulator upgrade program, is a fully replicated 
and functional cockpit trainer built initially for the KC-135E model aircraft with a visual system 
and a three Degree of Freedom (DOF) motion system. One additional difference between the 
OFT and the WST is that on the WST the KC-135E cockpit configuration aft of the pilot and co-
pilot seats is realistically represented (e.g., circuit breaker panels).  
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Figure 5. KC-135 OFT with Six Degree of Freedom Motion Base.6 
The Boom Operator Part Task Trainer (BOPTT) consists of a complete boom compartment that 
provides the student with the capability to practice normal refueling procedures. The initial 
BOPTT was developed by Aeronautical Systems Division (now Aeronautical Systems Center) in 
the late 1970s as a proof of concept device to study the training aspects of boom operator tasks. 
This device was upgraded and a second device was built in the 1980s. Both BOPTTs have been 
refurbished over the years as funds became available in order to provide increased reliability, 
maintainability, and supportability. These refurbishment efforts included a new visual system, 
new databases, control loading, and sound, as well as onboard and off board Instructor Operator 
Stations, see Figure 6. These improvements now offer boom operators the same levels of training 
pilots and copilots are currently obtaining.  
In addition, AETC has recently completed the development and production of two Boom 
Operator Weapon System Trainers that are currently being installed at the school house located 
at Altus. These devices will have a distributed mission operation capability within the 
schoolhouse that when linked to the OFTs will allow for initial interactive crew (pilot, co-pilot, 
boom operator) training.  
                                                 
6
 Altus AFB, Photo courtesy of MacAulay Brown 
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Figure 6. Boom Operator Part Task Trainer.7 
Cockpit Familiarization Trainers (CFTs) see Figure 7, basically consist of non-powered cockpit 
panel replications that are used for training switch position, gauge position, and limited normal 
procedures training. The Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) Interactive Hand Controller 
Part Task Trainer (GIPTTs) (Figure 8) supports familiarization and dexterity training for the new 
GATM interactive hand controllers. The CBTs are used to teach various topics (e.g., system 
theory) through interactive software. The CLT is a full-sized trainer that uses a modified KC-135 
fuselage to train boom operators on cargo loading and handling. The Air Force Mission Support 
System (AFMSS) computers are used to train students in fully utilizing the Air Force mission 
planning system and assist with flight planning of training missions. 
 
Figure 7. Cockpit Familiarization Trainer (CFT). 8 
                                                 
7
 Acme-worldwide.com 
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Figure 8. GATM IHC Part Task Trainers (GIPTT).9 
3. KC-135 ATS Upgrade Program 
3.1 ATS System Acquisition Team 
3.1.1 ATS Stakeholders  
The KC-135 community is one of the largest in the Air Force, and therefore, has a broad group 
of stakeholders with specific roles and responsibilities associated with the operation and 
maintenance of the training system. AMC/A3T, Scott AFB, Illinois, establishes ATS policy 
direction, identifies training requirements, and sets program priorities. AMC also has 
responsibility for planning, programming, budgeting and execution of resources necessary to 
support ATS programs as well as funding, acquiring, and maintaining aircrew training devices to 
a single baseline at both Formal Training Unit (FTU) and Continuation Training (CT) locations. 
Key stakeholders include the following organizations.  
The 551
st
 Aircraft Sustainment Squadron at Tinker AFB is responsible for identifying 
requirements for hardware and software upgrades to the flight simulators based on aircraft 
weapon system modifications in order to maintain ATS simulator concurrency with the aircraft‘s 
fielded configuration. Funding for these modifications, which is included in the budget for the 
specific aircraft modification program, comes from AMC to the KC-135 program office.  
The 507
th
 Aircraft Sustainment Squadron, Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC), Hill AFB, 
Utah, has the responsibility to provide the engineering, contractual, and administrative expertise 
                                                                                                                                                             
8
 Altus AFB, Photo courtesy of MacAulay Brown 
9
 Altus AFB, Photo courtesy of MacAulay Brown 
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and sustainment support to ensure that the simulator requirements identified by AMC and the 
KC-135 Program Office are implemented. In addition, Ogden is also responsible for managing 
simulator technology upgrades and identifying future requirements based on needed 
improvements to flight simulator fidelity, reliability, and maintainability. Funding for 
modifications that are directly the result of aircraft modifications are obtained from the 551st 
Aircraft Sustainment Squadron whereas modifications resulting from the need to either address 
technology upgrades or life cycle related improvements come directly from AMC. 
The 677
th
 Training System Product Group (Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel 
Command, WPAFB, Ohio,) provides additional simulator expertise and acquisition support to 
the 507
th
 Aircraft Sustainment Squadron when needed. The overall mission of the Training 
Systems Product Group is to provide the development, acquisition and sustainment effort needed 
to meet the major commands‘ simulation and training requirements. 
Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Randolph AFB, Texas, has overall responsibility 
to train the Air Forces‘ aircrews for all its flying systems. In April 2006, the KC-135 ATS 
program realigned training responsibilities between the major team players. AMC delegated to 
AETC oversight of Formal Training Unit (FTU) training at AETC bases. Specifically, the 97
th
 
Air Mobility Wing (headquartered at Altus AFB, Oklahoma) has the responsibility to provide the 
ground and flight aircrew training needed to keep the KC-135 aircrews operationally ready. 
AETC has the responsibility for developing the syllabus for initial crew training at the 
schoolhouse as well as responsibility for accepting all KC-135 ATS courseware. AMC retained 
responsibility for continuation training (CT) at KC-135 operational locations. This was a 
significant organizational change to the composition of the KC-135 stakeholders. 
AMC Air Operations Squadron DET 2 (stationed at Altus AFB) has the responsibility for overall 
simulator quality assurance, which includes review of all Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) 
and Acceptance Test Procedures (ATPs) and verifying and validating that the contractor has met 
the Air Force requirements as specified.  
FlightSafety Services Corporation (FlightSafety), headquartered in Centennial, Colorado, 
provides all KC-135 ground-based training. Also covered under this contract is KC-135 ATS 
program management, staffing of qualified instructors, logistics, aircrew training device (ATD) 
operations and maintenance, training system support center (TSSC) operations, including 
configuration/concurrency management of hardware, software, and courseware for both the 
schoolhouse and various operating sites, Simulator Certification (SIMCERT) support, and 
training management system (TMS) operations. FlightSafety‘s 15-year contract for KC-135 
training was awarded in 1992, with a three-year extension in 2007. Today, some 3,900 aircrew 
members receive FlightSafety training on the KC-135 every year at bases in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Japan.  
3.1.2 Teaming Relationship 
The philosophy employed by the KC-135 ATS senior engineering and management leadership 
emphasizes the importance of open communication lines between the various stakeholders. Since 
the beginning of the current O&M contract phase, which began in 1992, the various stakeholders 
who comprise the KC-135 ATS team, have evolved a professional partnership that is highlighted 
by a non-adversarial relationship based on a recognition of and willingness to champion the 
program‘s common goals and objectives. As a result, the team has established a level of trust 
between all members, communications/dialogue is very open, and Government involvement is 
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encouraged. The result has been a capability to deal with challenges and setbacks without 
personal recriminations and the development of a solution-oriented mindset. Major 
modifications, particularly to the Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), have been successfully 
planned for, budgeted, and implemented over the past 17 years. There are several reasons on why 
this teaming relationship has succeeded.  
Typically with acquisition programs the program manager or chief engineer charged with the 
development program would chair major reviews (like the KC-135 ATS System Review Board 
[SRB]) with the using command (in this case AMC) providing a briefing of their issues and 
concerns at the SRB. However, the arrangement that has evolved for KC-135 ATS, which has 
proven to be very effective, is that the AMC manager co-chairs the SRB forum. This 
arrangement started at the initiation of the current contract in 1992. The Program Manager 
realized that sharing responsibility would give AMC ownership in the success of the ATS. He 
made it a practice to invite representatives from all of the host squadrons (where the OFTs were 
located) around the world. All were given an opportunity to air their grievances and actions were 
taken to address them. The team believes the KC-135 ATS program is far too big, with too many 
team members and with far too much activity, to accept passive leadership. Having this level of 
commitment and active engagement from all of the stakeholders has facilitated obtaining the 
funding and support needed to ensure the program goals of achieving and maintaining 
concurrency, training effectiveness, etc., are realized.  
The KC-135 aircrew training system has developed an infrastructure that provides for ready and 
efficient simulator training for KC-135 refueling crews stationed around the world. The team 
determined that separate Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for each individual 
modification/upgrade can‘t be effectively used, given the small staffs assigned and the highly 
intertwined nature of the programs. Often modifications are combined or delayed at certain 
locations to accommodate local training needs and schedules, as well as coordinate with the 
arrival of modified aircraft to prevent having capabilities out of sync for too long of a period of 
time. This occurs with a great deal of collaboration and planning between all parties, including 
the KC-135 aircraft program office. AMC, the ATS Program Office, and the prime contractor(s) 
draw on support as needed to ensure proper staffing is available for program execution. Another 
reason for the team‘s success is their ability to be flexible and react quickly to customer needs. 
For example, the O&M contractor has a flat management structure. The number of management 
levels between the senior ATS systems engineer and the division vice president is two. The 
advantage of such an organizational structure is the ability to rapidly elevate major program 
issues to senior leadership, including possible mitigating actions, in order to achieve timely 
program resolution.  
Another major reason for the KC-135 ATS success, as viewed by many of the stakeholders, in 
implementing all these upgrade modifications is the fact that the entire KC-135 Simulator team 
understands the warfighters‘ training needs, because they are, in the case of the O&M contractor, 
the trainers. They are invested in the success of the program. The products developed, either by 
FlightSafety or other third-party contractors, are used by themselves. Therefore, they have good 
insight into what the products must do. In other words, FlightSafety is the user (instructors and 
maintainers).  
Furthermore, a close relationship between the training community and the aircraft community 
has been encouraged and supported. This relationship was not always so congenial. A great deal 
of effort was made in the 1994 timeframe where members of the 507
th
 continually were 
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―inserting‖ itself to plead that simulators and training requirements not be forgotten, as has been 
the case in many Air Force programs in the past. History shows that the training system has, in 
many cases, been viewed not as a critical part of the overall weapon system but as a funding 
source for addressing other aircraft related developmental issues thereby impacting schedule. 
Furthermore, this lack of senior-level support for the concurrent development of a training 
system has resulted in many training systems being late to need. Over time, this relationship 
between the KC-135 aircraft program and the KC-135 ATS program has evolved and become 
more formalized. Because aircraft upgrades are identified by the KC-135 Program Office at 
Tinker AFB there are roadmap meetings held at Tinker where upcoming modifications to the 
KC-135 aircraft are discussed. The KC-135 ATS O&M contractor and the Training System 
Program Office at Ogden now are present to assess those modifications and ensure the ATS 
requirements are included in the early planning process. In addition, the O&M contractor does 
have the ability to go through the KC-135 ATS Program Office at Ogden to request approval to 
attend the KC-135 program Office CCBs at Tinker AFB if there is an indication an upcoming 
modification to the aircraft may affect the ATS. This strategy allows for the aircraft modification 
to account for and fund the simulator modification from one single program activity. This early 
involvement also provides the ATS community with an opportunity to begin the planning and 
coordinating process for incorporating training system requirements into the aircraft program as 
needed thereby reducing cost and schedule risk to the ATS upgrade. Because of the early success 
of this approach with the Pacer CRAG modification, these practices have become 
institutionalized.  
Although FlightSafety is the O&M contractor responsible for maintaining and operating the ATS 
as well as retaining responsibility for meeting overall Air Force training needs, there have been 
cases where the Government has opted to contract with a third party for specific upgrades to the 
ATS. It was recognized by all stakeholders that meeting Air Force training requirements was at 
risk without proper involvement by FlightSafety early in the contracted effort. A more formal 
process has evolved to ensure early involvement by the O&M contractor in the development 
effort to ensure training needs continue to be met. The process has evolved from the painful 
lessons learned in some of the earlier efforts, particularly two of the simulator upgrade efforts, 
the visual system upgrade and the aerodynamic upgrade. 
AMC and AETC communicate often to ensure that the training systems and the schoolhouse are 
meeting the demands of the user. The ATS program manager has a direct interface with AETC. 
These two organizations communicate either informally via telephone calls or more formally at 
focused reviews (e.g., SRBs). Their formal relationship is described in AFI 11-202 Volume 1, as 
lead command or AETC as training command. They also operate under a command-to-command 
memorandum of agreement (MOA). This process, which has continued to evolve, has improved 
the team‘s ability to identify and resolve issues early thereby reducing the incident of last 
minute/uncoordinated changes to the program. One of the challenges faced by the team which 
has been overcome through close cooperation among all stakeholders affects courseware 
development. FlightSafety is responsible for developing all the KC-135 ATS related courseware 
with all courseware including continuation training courseware going through AETC. Although 
all instructors at the schoolhouse are AMC assets and requirements for courseware are driven by 
AMC, courseware must be developed using AETC approved processes with all courseware 
developed by FlightSafety is evaluated by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from AETC‘s 97th 
AMW. At the time of the change of the schoolhouse location from Castle AFB to Altus AFB, 
FlightSafety was directed to incorporate Instructional Systems Development processes into their 
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courseware development as embodied in AFMAN 36-2206, etc. The process was formalized 
with a contract change. Close cooperation by all team members is essential to ensure courseware 
development is complete, accurate, and timely. Another challenge that needed to be addressed 
involved obtaining permission for simulator instructors to go on KC-135 training sorties. Prior to 
1993 while the schoolhouse was at Castle AFB and run by AMC, the military simulator 
instructors were permitted to fly on these training sorties. AETC‘s position was basically 
simulator instructors don‘t fly! It took years to overcome this reluctance and obtain permission 
for simulator instructors to fly on training sorties. Developing and fostering a professional 
relationship over time can facilitate resolution of these types of challenges. 
In addition to major program reviews, such as the SRB, the team relies on working groups 
comprised of all the stakeholders to assist in the day-to-day management of the training system. 
For example a Training System Configuration Working Group (TSCWG) meets at Altus 
monthly to review the status of all hardware, software, and courseware tasks/modifications 
requested, the configuration of the ATS, and all change requests submitted by the government or 
contractor personnel. The TSCWG then prioritizes this new work for incorporation into the ATS. 
For example, Altus was experiencing power fluctuations in the schoolhouse. These power 
fluctuations affect simulator availability thereby affecting training throughput. FlightSafety 
advised the ATS Program Office at Ogden of the problem and a new system was installed.
10
  
The team also utilizes a requirement verification and prioritization review board (called the 
SPRR System Priority Requirements Review) that, in addition to upgrades driven by weapon 
system changes, addresses sustainment related hardware and software deficiencies/upgrades 
required to improve flight simulator fidelity. Prioritization reviews include representatives from 
the KC-135 Program Office, Ogden, Contractors (aircraft and simulator), and user. Requirements 
driven by aircraft modifications and/or sustainment upgrades are reviewed and prioritized. The 
O&M contractor then costs out the proposed program based on prioritized requirements and 
conducts a risk assessment. The KC-135 ATS Program Manager, based on this information, 
gives the ―go-ahead‖ and the Program Office or AMC provides the appropriate funding to Ogden 
for implementation. While this arrangement was not always the case, professional relationships 
and early successes by the program have formalized this relationship. 
Additionally, the contractor utilizes a Database Working Group to assess any applicable 
simulator models (i.e., visual system markings, flight line configurations, etc.) to ensure the 
updated database will support meeting training requirements. The training team also participates 
in the KC-135 Cockpit Working Group at Tinker AFB. The Cockpit Working Group, which is 
comprised of representatives from the KC-135 Program Office at Tinker, AMC, and the KC-135 
tanker prime contractor (Rockwell Collins), is tasked with the responsibility of assessing each 
potential change to the aircraft from a training perspective and identifying potential impacts to 
the aircraft training system. This is accomplished by reviewing all applicable Form 1067s 
11
, 
Modification Proposal, which identify pending modifications to the aircraft. If the O&M 
contractor for the training system sees something that may affect the ATS they notify the ATS 
Program Office. If the proposed change is within the contract‘s level of effort (LOE) then the 
                                                 
10
 Ogden scrambled and collaborated with AMC to redirect or find additional dollars to pay for the power 
conditioners—some of the collaboration was with the C-5 program, schoolhouse and government simulator program 
management (also located at Ogden). Together, AMC and Ogden were able to facilitate a win-win solution 
benefiting multiple parties. 
11
 AFI 63-1101 
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TSCWG can incorporate without further contract action. If the scope of work is outside the LOE 
then it is out of scope for the TSCWG and a letter is sent to ATS Program Management 
identifying the need for either an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) or a Contract Change 
Proposal (CCP). The ATS Program Office at Ogden ALC and AMC then prioritize the change 
and a formal request is made for a proposal to incorporate the change into the ATS. The 
existence of LOE is in essence a type of management reserve, however, it has always been 
protected from cuts due to the common (although faulty) understanding that it is for software 
maintenance.  
3.2 KC-135 ATS Performance Requirements 
AMC has emphasized two key program goals that formed the foundation of the KC-135 ATS 
upgrade strategy. The first addressed the need for concurrency, which is to ensure the OFT is 
upgraded and ready for training prior to the aircraft with its modifications being fielded. The 
second addressed General Fogleman‘s goal to upgrade operational flight simulator training 
effectiveness. The first goal emerged as a result of early successes in the execution of the 
simulator‘s upgrade strategy concurrent with a major aircraft upgrade and modification program. 
To address the issue of concurrency, AMC initiates all new requirements for simulator 
modifications with a goal of modifying the simulators 60-days ahead of the operational 
deployment of the aircraft. This practice emerged in the mid-90s as the KC-135 aircraft was 
undergoing the Pacer CRAG modification. The fact that these upgrades were being done at 
roughly the same time as the separate simulator upgrade program added to the complexity and 
challenges faced by the simulator Government and contractor personnel. Given the early success 
of having the simulators ready to train aircrews prior to the first aircraft arriving set the standard 
for all future modifications to the simulators. To ensure the proper emphasis is placed on 
concurrency, KC-135 ATS systems engineers both within the Government and the ATS support 
contractor review every modification to the aircraft to determine if the modification will affect 
the OFT and aircrew training programs.  
As mentioned earlier, with the progression of technology and the capabilities of flight simulation 
were recognized, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) revisions were made to permit the 
increased use of simulators in approved training programs as defined by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Advanced Simulation Plan. To support this plan, the National Simulator 
Evaluation Program was established by the FAA in October 1980. The need for standard criteria 
was necessitated by the use of simulators for training and checking. The evolution of simulator 
technology and the increased permitted use required a similar evolution of the criteria for 
simulator qualification. Minimum requirements for qualifying aircraft simulators to Level A (non 
visual system equipped), Level B, Level C, or Level D are specified in FAA 120-40 Simulator 
Standards and Appendix 1 to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-40B. The procedures and criteria 
for simulator evaluations under the National Simulator Evaluation Program are contained in 
FAA AC 120-40B. This AC provides an acceptable means of compliance with the FAR 
regarding the evaluation and qualification of airplane simulators used in training programs or 
airmen checking under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Criteria specified in this AC 
are those used by the FAA to determine whether a simulator is qualified and the qualification 
level. While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and 
industry experience in determining compliance with the pertinent FAR. 
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Flight simulator subsystems and/or functions that would typically be impacted by compliance to 
the guidelines of the National Simulator Evaluation Program would include: the cockpit physical 
geometry; controls, and displays; aerodynamic modeling; cockpit sounds; the motion system; 
and the visual system. For example, some of the minimum requirements needed to qualify an 
aircraft simulator to Level C would include: 
 A full-scale replica of the airplane‘s cockpit including all relevant instruments involved 
in the simulation automatically responding accurately to control movement by a 
crewmember or external disturbances such as wind shear or turbulence. 
 Control forces and control travel corresponding to that of the replicated aircraft. 
 Instructor station to enable an instructor to control all required system variables including 
abnormal or emergency conditions. 
 Aircraft sounds corresponding to those of the airplane. 
 Effect of aerodynamic changes for various combinations of drag and thrust encountered 
in flight corresponding to actual flight conditions. 
 Brake and tire failure dynamics based on airplane-related data. 
 Visual cues sufficient to assess sink rate and depth perception during takeoff and landing. 
AMC recognized the guidelines defined by the FAA Standard and the AC provided a means by 
which improvements to the KC-135 OFTs could be assessed to ensure they achieve their goal of 
meeting FAA Level C simulator requirements. It also provided a benchmark against which AMC 
could transfer aircrew training activities to the simulator without compromising aircrew 
proficiency or safety. In order to qualify the KC-135 ATS system to this higher standard certain 
new capabilities, in addition to those driven by aircraft concurrency, needed to be planned for 
and incorporated into the flight simulator through an ongoing comprehensive simulator upgrade 
program which was initiated in the early 1990‘s.  
Effectiveness of the KC-135 ATS is a key input into the requirements generation process 
associated with the simulator program. Effectiveness is the degree of mission accomplishment of 
a system used by representative personnel (trainees) in the planned environment. Effectiveness is 
also a measure of concurrency with the aircraft system as represented by the training equipment 
and courseware. The effectiveness of the training and equipment is determined by the criteria of 
student throughput and student success rate.  
To support this long term upgrade initiative by AMC, a support services contract was 
competitively awarded to FlightSafety Services Corporation, Centennial Colorado in 1992. 
Under this contract the contractor agreed to provide, within the schedule requirements and at the 
prices stated, all KC-135 aircrew members ground-based training required to meet the 
qualification levels as listed in the KC-135 ATS System Specification, SS-07878-7010, dated 23 
March 1992 and the Air Force instruction AFI 11-202 Volume 2 ―Aircrew 
Standardization/Evaluation Program.‖ The Air Force retained final authority on the satisfactory 
completion of the guaranteed student qualification.  
In addition, the KC-135 ATS program defined system performance by essentially three key 
requirements all of which were included in the Operations and Maintenance Contract with 
FlightSafety: 1) the KC-135 ATS shall provide the capability to meet AMC student throughput 
requirements; 2) the contractor shall ensure formal school students graduate the academics 
portion on time; and 3) the ATS contract guarantees trained students meet government standards 
(i.e., success rate). This latter point is referred to as guaranteed aircrew qualification levels. 
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Successful training is defined by the user as the devices needed to provide the training as 
required by the KC135E/R Master Task List (MTL), and by providing that training in an 
effective manner. Any remediation training determined to be required by the Government will 
be, according to the contract, provided by FlightSafety at no cost to the Government. The MTL 
provides a baseline document that describes those aircraft tasks that are to be trained on the 
KC135E/R Aircrew Training System. This baseline MTL is under strict configuration control by 
AMC. All modifications and updates to any ATS device are tested to the MTL. In addition, the 
KC-135 ATS team relies on course ending surveys/comments prepared by students, which 
includes a rating of the training value received (scale of 1 to 5), consistent monitoring of 
student‘s performance and progression, and, as a final proof, a Government-conducted check 
ride to ensure this requirement is met. Through consistent monitoring of the student during 
training FlightSafety can and will recommend a student be washed out by the Government. This 
has proven not to be a typical occurrence. The fact that this very rarely happens has been 
attributed to the quality of the incoming students. Data has shown that only two students have 
required remedial training since the current O&M contract has been in effect (reference contract 
F33657-91-C-0072, PWS). Feedback is taken seriously and modifications are considered if 
training effectiveness can be improved within the requirements of the MTL. 
3.3 KC-135 ATS Systems Engineering Process 
The SE process employed by the KC-135 ATS team consists of an integrated System 
Engineering process tailored to the development, implementation, and maintenance of aircrew 
training systems. At contract award in 1992 FlightSafety was not required to follow an SE 
standard since many of the applicable MIL-SPECS and Standards that would have applied had 
been cancelled by senior DoD leadership under streamlining initiatives then in vogue. 
Commercial best practices were to be employed on all Air Force contracts at that time. 
Fortunately FlightSafety did have an internal corporate level SE process they were obliged to 
follow on their programs. The SE process was initially based on the American National 
Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Association Standard 632 (ANSI/EIA-632) Processes 
for Engineering a System modified to account for the training system development domain. This 
process has continued to evolve and mature based on lessons learned gained from facing and 
overcoming challenges presented by the upgrade program, by increased Air Force emphasis on 
SE, and willingness by the user to identify the dollars necessary to fund the implementation of 
SE activities within the program. For example, one of the early challenges faced by the team was 
maintaining cognizance over risk management/risk mitigation to ensure issues were being 
identified and resolved in a timely manner. The team recognized that added emphasis had to be 
placed on managing risk mitigation in order to ensure the right people were assigned to work the 
problem, mitigation plans were realistic and implementable, and that the required work was on 
track to being completed on schedule. Since one of the primary focus areas of the contractor‘s In 
Process Reviews is deficiency correction and mitigation planning the team developed a process 
by which the reviews would have an additional agenda item which was to track these mitigation 
efforts. As a result, the team developed and initiated a specific 30/60/90 day get-well process that 
is now employed on all contracts thereby ensuring proper emphasis is placed by the team on the 
tracking and timely resolution of key mitigation actions. SE has since been incorporated into the 
ATS contract.  
The current maturity level of the contractor‘s SE process is reflected in the contractor‘s Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP) dated February 1, 2008. Based on the SE process, as documented in the 
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SEP, specific SE related tasks for each contract action are identified for the Systems Engineer to 
implement. These are formally documented in the KC-135 ATS Performance Work Statement 
(PWS) and applicable Statement of Work (SOW) associated with the specific modification 
program. Some of the key tasks that illustrate the Systems Engineer‘s roles and responsibilities 
on these programs/modifications include: translating user goals into verifiable and measureable 
program technical requirements, tracking cost and schedule performance; conducting risk 
assessments; and tracking applicable program metrics (e.g., spare IO, memory, design status 
percent complete; test status percent complete; test failure reports) to ensure program 
requirements continue to be met.  
One aspect which should be noted at this point is that the KC-135 systems engineering process 
does not utilize an Integrated Master Plan (IMP) per se, but focuses on a project‘s unique 
milestone schedule, which includes schedule risks and schedule metrics that reflect the 
incremental milestone achievements. This detailed program schedule with metrics is similar in 
content to the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). This ―IMS‖ also has the capability to assess 
critical paths for the various projects, as required. This is where the ―contractor format‖ was 
deemed sufficient since at the time of the contract award, most formal SE processes were traded 
or ―contractor best practices‖ were deemed sufficient. 
In addition, while specific requirements (products, milestone events) for each program are 
formally spelled out in the applicable engineering change proposals (to include schedules, data 
deliverables, SOW, and flow-down of Government regulations and conditions), system 
engineering process related requirements are not formally flowed down to vendors. FlightSafety 
has their preferred suppliers with proven track records and their internal processes are well 
understood. To date, this has not been a real issue with known suppliers.
12
 ECPs typically require 
the following:  
 Executive Summary 
 SOW 
 Program Schedule 
 A description of the effect the ECP will have on the product Configuration Identification 
Specifications 
 A description of the effect the ECP will have on the Integrated Logistics Support 
elements 
 A description of the effect the ECP will have on the operational employment 
(maintainability, reliability) 
 Proposed changes to the contract 
 Specification Change Notices 
 System Safety Report 
 
3.3.1 Requirements Process 
The contractor, either the O&M support contractor or third party contractor is responsible for 
identifying, allocating, and documenting requirements in the applicable system/subsystem 
                                                 
12
 This commercial ―best practice‖ is well known within the Lean community and is a practice most readily 
attributed to the experiences of Toyota in its product development process. 
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specifications through change pages for each modification.
13
 For example, requirements that can  
be quantifiably verified for the visual system such as resolution and brightness, shadows, 
antennas, and hinge lines are documented in the specifications.  
The verification process relies on acceptance test procedures (ATPs). New or modified ATPs 
may be required. For example, the visual system upgrade required a new stand-alone ATP, 
manuals, etc. These ATPs are conducted to verify compliance of the modification with the 
requirements as specified in the Prime Item Development Specification. Low-level detailed 
testing by subcontractors and/or third-party contractors is performed to validate the subsystem 
performance. Functional mission tests are Government conducted tests of the prototype 
modification which utilize Government defined scenarios to evaluate the operational 
characteristics of the systems within the context of conducting the mission. Both the Government 
and the O&M contractor have a stated common objective to ensure student throughput is 
minimally impacted by software updates or configuration changes. Therefore, the contractor 
usually develops a prototype trainer modification and schedules the prototype which is used to 
validate system performance at a site with multiple trainers so that impacts affecting student 
throughput are minimized. This is a ―best practice‖ that has emerged through the experience of 
the contractor while performing simulator modifications and upgrades. 
Revisions to courseware products, such as, classroom lecture, computer based training (CBT), 
training device, and aircraft lessons are verified and validated via the formative evaluation 
processes that include subject matter expert (SME) review, and individual tryouts (ITOs) and 
small group tryouts (SGTOs) where applicable. SGTOs and ITOs are applicable for more 
complex projects that include task/objective changes, new lessons, or major changes to existing 
lessons. In the case of training devices, Instructional System Development (ISD) derived training 
objectives are translated into measurable and verifiable performance requirements and verified, 
along with Performance Specification requirements, as part of the Development Test and 
Evaluation (DT&E) process. Operational Evaluation is carried out continuously via collection of 
student and instructor comments and by evaluation of student performance.  
The O&M support contractor focuses on training mission needs and training value. Formal 
SIMCERTS conducted approximately every six months by the Air Force, verifies the ATS 
continues to meet system specification requirements for the hardware and software. As a part of 
the contractor‘s systems engineering process the contractor‘s various site managers typically run 
an internal SIMCERT checklist annually in conjunction with Quality Assurance from 
FlightSafety at Altus to ensure continued compliance with requirements. The entire ATS is 
reviewed at quarterly SRBs while student critiques are reviewed during monthly Training 
System Configuration Working Group (TSCWG) meetings at Altus. The entire KC-135 training 
program is reviewed annually in group forum via the Realistic Training Review Board (RTRB).  
Ultimately for an OFT to be effective as a training device the aero models, visual system models, 
aircraft/cockpit sounds, etc., must provide the student with sufficient cues that are realistic 
enough to provide for realistic training. For ground-based training devices, this is really a 
qualitative assessment about the realism of the simulator meaning, it‘s a judgment call by the test 
crews and Air Force instructors about the systems ―training value.‖ To the systems engineer, this 
issue of subjective testing has been an ongoing simulator dilemma. It has proven extremely 
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 This is a direct result of what the Air Force would consider the Total System Performance Responsibility FSSC 
has for the KC-135 ATS. 
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difficult for systems engineers to quantitatively specify this training value. No matter how much 
experience a team has quantifying and measuring simulator performance, in reality it remains a 
qualitative assessment about the realism of the simulator. The challenge for the systems engineer 
in a training program is to not only develop performance requirements that can be measured and 
verified but also develop the process by which ―training value‖ can be qualitatively assessed 
while protecting against personality-driven assessments that can change with Government 
personnel turnover. 
3.3.2 Risk Management 
FlightSafety‘s risk management process (Figures 9 and 10) employs typical risk management 
categories, i.e., risk identification, assessment, handling, and monitoring. Any member of the 
KC-135 ATS team, contractor or Government, may identify a risk. Sources of information used 
to identify risks include; lessons learned on similar programs, expert interviews and studies, 
plans and documents evaluations (e.g., PWS, Specification, etc.), management reports, formal 
Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) documentation and observations. Risk management is 
in accordance with FlightSafety‘s established processes as outlined in their Systems Engineering 
Plan and risk disposition is always considered a purposeful action with moderate or high risk 
disposition activities always including the Government to ensure their continuous visibility into 
risk mitigation and closure planning/action. Risk management is assessed at all major design and 
program reviews including joint meetings between the aircraft and training communities. For 
example, the KC-135 aircraft Cockpit Working Group, which has FlightSafety and Ogden 
participation, reviews all aircraft related program risks, current mitigation status, and whether 
those risks have implications to the training system. In addition, the KC-135 ATS SRB, which 
has KC-135 Program Office participation, also reviews all training system-related risks from 
both an aircraft and training system perspective. These joint meetings ensure the risk 
management process assesses not only those risks associated with the development and fielding 
of a specific system but look across the portfolio of programs to ascertain the possible inter-
reaction these risks may have on other elements of the weapon system. 
An example of the program‘s approach to risk mitigation is in the area of courseware 
development which is somewhat constrained by the availability of aircraft technical orders 
(TOs). Many times these TOs are late to need because of a variety of reasons (budget constraints, 
schedule slippages to kit proofing of an aircraft modification). The preferred approach is to not 
release the courseware until the final TOs are released unless the changes are considered minor 
(redlined TOs). In some cases, these red lined documents must be used to develop the required 
courseware for the ATS. In those cases, any release of courseware based on incomplete technical 
orders is mutually agreed upon by all stakeholders, the risk noted and accepted by all parties, and 
risk mitigation planning put into place to address issues which may arise as a result of then 
incorporating the finished documents. This highlights some of the frustrations that did exist 
between the KC-135 program office and the ATS program office. If the ATS program office is 
not aware of or included in 135 modifications and tech order publication issues, training is often 
degraded. Where the ATS remains involved, the risk can be mitigated by having some insight (or 
advance copies) of the new TOs. Nevertheless, this risk is completely out of the control of the 
ATS contractor and if not addressed during the development phase of the 135 program can 
threaten the ability of the ATS to meet its goal of having training available and in place 60 days 
before the delivery of a modified aircraft. 
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Figure 9. Risk Management Process.14 
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Figure 10. Risk Assessment Model.15 
3.3.3 Configuration Management 
FlightSafety operates the KC-135 Simulator configuration management (CM) system in 
accordance with the cancelled MIL-STD-973 and MIL-HDBK-61 as a guide. These items were 
originally referenced in the original contract RFP and bidders were asked to incorporate these 
into their processes. Additionally, many other ANSI, ATSM, etc., standards that existed were 
available in the early years of the current contract. The government team was fortunate that many 
of these standards were freely available before commercial standard organizations figured out 
how to charge money for them. Once this happened, access to these kinds of standards was often 
denied or even discouraged by other Government entities (e.g., this is the era of commercial best 
practices – we‘ll let them decide what to do – but an unintended consequence was fettered 
Government understanding of what best practices were actually out there.) Configuration 
management responsibility rests with the contractor‘s Training System Support Center (TSSC) at 
Altus AFB with oversight by both Ogden and DET 2. The Government must approve all Class I 
ECPs and CCPs. The Training System Configuration Working Group (TSCWG) is the joint 
contractor and government organization that reviews and coordinates on all changes. A typical 
agenda of the TSCWG would address Level of Effort (LOE) usage, courseware work status 
(TSCO status, action items, and new change requests), engineering work status (to include new 
change requests), other change requests and Government issues. Configuration management, in 
conjunction with systems engineering, plans for and conducts FCAs/PCAs. The purpose of these 
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audits are twofold: verification that the implemented design achieves its goals via systematic 
comparison of requirements with results of tests, demonstrations, inspections, and analysis as 
documented in the system performance specification; and verification that the product‘s 
documentation provides an accurate description of the product that can serve as the baseline for 
future modifications. 
3.3.4 Design Reviews 
The KC-135 program requires formal reviews, tailored based on the size and complexity of the 
modification program, be held during the development phase to ensure that the entire KC-135 
ATS team is working to the same requirements, designing and developing the correct 
modification, adequately testing the mod and generating the appropriate courseware changes. 
The reviews employed throughout the modification development and verification process may 
include a Systems Requirements Review (SRR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical 
Design Review (CDR), Test Readiness Review (TRR), Required Assets Available Review 
(RAAR) and In Process Reviews (IPR). Occasionally, Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) 
will be held to supplement the formal reviews. As a minimum, an SRR and a TRR will be 
conducted for all modifications. This also includes requiring formal participation by the prime 
ATS O&M contractor in third-party design reviews of training system modifications as well as 
participation in design reviews associated with aircraft upgrades to ensure the training 
community is working in parallel with the aircraft community and that overall training 
requirements for the system will be met. 
16
 
The following is a brief synopsis of KC-135 ATS unique systems engineering aspects of these 
major reviews:  
a. System Requirements Review (SRR): The purpose of this review is to ensure that the KC-
135 Simulator team has mutual expectations and understanding of requirements and that the 
contractor‘s proposed preliminary designs and program plan satisfies the development 
specification. In some cases based on preliminary assessments of the design the contractor 
has proposed a more fully functional system than what would be needed to meet specific 
training needs. An example of this is the incorporation of a Terrain Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS) into the OFT. TCAS utilized a commercial model that simulated the entire 
system and its capabilities. The contractor determined to incorporate every capability 
regardless if the capability was really needed to address specific near term training needs. 
Although incorporating full functionality as a given in the overall program strategy provided 
the ATS with more capability than the student would need for training it did provide the 
capability for future growth in the system. This is an example of the ―systemic thinking‖ that 
occurs in the ATS at all levels. The Government suggested to the contractor this would be a 
good ―investment‖ in the future as GATM and other aircraft modifications were being 
planned that would require the training and full use of TCAS capabilities. The price 
difference between the full capability and a marginal capability was deemed minimal and 
AMC agreed to fund the full capability. 
b. Preliminary Design Review (PDR)/Critical Design Review (CDR): The purpose of the PDR 
and CDR is to review contractor assumptions, design criteria baseline and designs for the 
modification, and to establish the contractor‘s readiness to proceed with the design or 
construction process. These reviews are co-chaired jointly by the Government and contractor. 
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As part of the Systems Engineering process, the KC-135 Simulator program utilizes a 
Requirement Traceability Program (RTP) that identifies, analyses, allocates, tracks and 
validates both explicit and derived requirements during the modification process. In addition, 
a syllabus of the training courses to be effected/provided, training material to be used, and 
preliminary acceptance test procedures (ATPs) are required at these reviews.  
c. In Process Reviews (IPR): The contractor conducts one IPR per month between CDR and the 
Test Readiness Review (TRR). The purpose of the IPR is to review the contractors‘ detailed 
progress. These IPRs are supported by contractor personnel (engineering, program 
management, contracts, etc), and Government program managers, engineers, equipment 
specialists, end user, and Detachment 2 SMEs. From these IPRs the contractor is able to put a 
box around what specific capabilities are to be delivered and what data is required. The 
current O&M support contractor has an advantage here since they already have good insight 
into the user‘s training requirements/needs. These IPRs are used to ensure timely 
involvement by all stakeholders in the design process early rather than waiting for the aircraft 
and/or simulators to be modified before all stakeholders have the opportunity to identify 
concerns/issues. The resolution of which would result in more costly changes once hardware 
has been developed.  
d. Test Readiness Review (TRR): The Government and contractor jointly host a TRR 
immediately before the commencement of the contractor and Government testing of the 
modification prototypes. The purpose of this review is to ensure that the Configuration Item 
is ready for commencement of testing, distribute ATP test documents, review the 
Discrepancy Report (DR) process, and to establish testing and work schedules. The presence 
of all applicable deliverable technical manuals and engineering documentation are a 
requirement for commencement of TRR. Engineers define the test procedures including 
regression testing as required to ensure all functionality designed into the ATS is verified. 
These Acceptance Test Procedures (ATPs), which are written at the system and subsystem 
level, are typically reviewed by engineering, quality assurance, and Det 2 Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs).  
e. Required Assets Available Review (RAAR): An RAAR is held at the completion of each 
modification installation and evaluation. The purpose of this review is to ensure that all 
Discrepancy Reports (DRs) that would impact the use of the applicable training system have 
been cleared, and that all remaining DRs have been prioritized, assigned, scheduled for work, 
and that authority for clearance of those DRs has been assigned. The RAAR for the prototype 
system requires completion of the Physical Configuration Audit (PCA). Successful 
completion of the RAAR and clearance of all ―A‖ Category DRs constitute the modified 
training system as ready for training (RFT). 
3.3.5 Instructional System Development 
The KC-135 ATS program is supported by two Instructional System Development (ISD) groups: 
the Courseware Development Department at FlightSafety headquarters (Centennial, CO) and the 
Courseware Support Center at the TSSC (Altus AFB OK). The TSSC Support Center‘s primary 
function is to maintain the existing KC-135 Formal Training Unit (FTU) and 
continuation/refresher training courseware. ISD consists of five phases: analysis, design, 
development, implementation and evaluation, along with additional efforts of planning and 
courseware maintenance. Evaluation is integrated as a function throughout each ISD phase and 
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as a central function of life-cycle operations. The FlightSafety technical approach is based upon 
a proven ISD model. The model is based on traditional military methodologies such as AFMAN 
36-2234 and AFH 36-2235 but also reflects modifications derived from proven commercial 
practices. Incorporation of the military methodologies was done in the timeframe AETC began 
insisting on reviewing courseware around the time of the schoolhouse move to Altus AFB. 
3.3.6 Integrated Logistics/Supportability 
As with aircraft systems, training systems must also have an integrated logistics/maintainability 
support structure to ensure continued operation. Logistics within the KC-135 ATS program is 
concerned with the total support of the system to assure its economic and effective operation 
throughout its life cycle. Logistics objectives for the program include achieving stated readiness 
objectives such as system availability, programmed flying training throughput; establishment of 
Reliability and Maintainability requirements needed to support readiness objectives; and 
emphasizing logistics support considerations in all design trade studies. As a result, during the 
development phase the systems engineer must maintain cognizant of the program‘s logistically 
driven needs such as a system‘s reliability, maintainability, and availability requirements in order 
to properly reflect those in the applicable system specification/specification change notices, 
ensure all design trade studies address these logistics requirements, and that key design reviews 
are structured to ensure logistics issues are adequately and timely addressed. In addition, it is 
important for the systems engineer to maintain awareness of potential life cycle issues such as 
diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS) or parts obsolescence (PO) issues to ensure there is 
adequate planning early in the design phase in order to mitigate the long-term effects of not 
adequately planning for the impacts such issues may cause once the design is fielded. 
As an example the Pacer CRAG Block 40 upgrade contract specified Critical Single Point 
Failure Items (SPFIs) will be considered in selection of maintenance concepts and computation 
of spares requirements.
17
 Critical SPFI are to be spared at the site level unless Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF) data indicates the repair cost is sufficiently high and the failure rate 
low or the item failure will not result in loss of training mission. Critical items are then be 
stocked at the depot level and supplied with a delay of less than 48 hours. One of the functions of 
the systems engineer is to ensure early identification of these critical SPFI. Additionally systems 
engineers ensure issues associated with parts obsolescence, Diminishing Manufacturing Sources, 
spares, etc. are briefed at the quarterly SRBs. The KC-135 OFT simulator leg refurbishment 
effort is one example of a legacy issue currently being addressed.
18
  
FlightSafety also maintains a list of priority modifications for AMC that can be implemented as 
fall-out money becomes available. FlightSafety has an ILS manager assigned to the TSSC at 
Altus who runs the PO/DMS effort. Four to five years ago, for example, the contractor advised 
AMC of the need for new power supplies. As a result of identifying a potential problem early, 
FlightSafety provided AMC a proposal for consideration. Due to small business rules that dictate 
in many cases the Government going directly to the vendor, the power supplies were procured 
from a third party.  
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 The genesis and incorporation of this ECP was due to a large failure due to a third party modification. The third 
party was not liable to maintain sufficient spares for the ATS nor responsive to the outage in training caused by the 
failure. 
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 The leg refurbishment has become an issue as a later modification, the visual system (a third-party modification), 
added an additional amount of weight to the OFT, causing issues with the structural integrity and life cycle of the 
simulator legs. 
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3.4 KC-135 ATS Upgrade Program 
Since 1992 the aircrew training system has evolved through a series of complex upgrades 
supported by a maturing systems engineering process into a highly effective ATS. The 
complexity of these upgrades rival those associated with development of major aircraft weapon 
systems. Not only must they replicate the aircraft‘s physical configuration, performance, and 
―feel‖ they must also replicate the total environment in which the aircraft operates. This is an 
absolutely critical point. Often times a program office, as well as the user, can‘t fathom why 
simulator upgrades are so expensive – sometimes rivaling the costs of aircraft modification 
programs. They often failed to recognize that these modifications and upgrades were new 
development efforts and not typical sustainment actions. 
In order to reach the level of training effectiveness now demonstrated by the KC-135 ATS, a 
series of upgrades were performed which ensured that both concurrency with the aircraft 
configuration and improvements to simulator fidelity were achieved and maintained Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. OFT Training Hours Used 2000-2007 
Major modifications performed during this phase of the program are a mix of 3010 aircraft 
acquisition (i.e., Pacer CRAG), 3010 simulator upgrade acquisition (i.e., motion, aero package, 
and visual system), and 3400 Operation and Maintenance (O&M). AMC also uses 3010 funding 
to address shortfalls in simulator fidelity, such as, upgrades to the visual system.
19
 Within 
existing O&M (3400) funding AMC is able to address repair/replacement of existing hardware 
with technology refresh efforts (i.e., Boom Operator Part Task Trainer (BIPTT) and the 
Instructor Operator Station System (IOSS).  
The KC-135 ATS program also took advantage of advancements in computing and visual 
technology to achieve significant improvements in providing cost-effective training to AMC 
crews. Currently, the 19 Operational Flight Trainers that comprise part of the KC-135 ATS meet 
FAA Level C simulator requirements as a result of the simulator upgrade program and have 
demonstrated a 99 percent availability factor ensuring KC-135 air crew training is delivered 
when and where needed (Figure 12 OFT Training Availability). 
Device CY2008 Jan-Sep CY2007 
OFT #1 Mildenhall 98.7% 99.6% 
OFT #2 Grand Forks 100% 100% 
OFT #3 Altus 99.6% 99.5% 
OFT #4 McConnell 100% 100% 
OFT #5 Kadena 100% 100% 
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 Additional modifications to the visual system upgrade, a third-party modification, which fell short of requirements 
and expectations. 
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Device CY2008 Jan-Sep CY2007 
OFT #6 Grissom 99% 99.2% 
OFT #7 March 96.9% 99.2% 
OFT #8 Fairchild 100% 100% 
OFT #9 Pease 100% 99.9% 
OFT #10 McConnell 100% 100% 
OFT #11 Meridian 100% 99% 
OFT #12 Altus 98.1% 99.9% 
OFT #13 Robins/Scott 99.7% 98.8% 
OFT #14 Altus 100% 100% 
OFT #15 Fairchild 100% 100% 
OFT #16 G Forks/McConnell 100% 99.1% 
OFT #17 Milwaukee 100% 100% 
OFT #18 Altus 99.9% 99.1% 
OFT #19 MacDill 100% 99.1% 
AVERAGE 99.4% 99.5% 
Figure 12. OFT Training Availability.20 
3.4.1 Motion System Upgrade 
 One of the first major upgrades to the OFTs occurred in May 1995 when the Government 
directed the O&M Contractor FlightSafety to install and interface a high performance 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) based 6 Degrees Of Freedom (DOF) motion system and 
related software onto the existing A/F 37A-T88 OFTs. As stated previously the OFTs were 
initially designed by Boeing Training Systems to accept a 6 DOF motion system. This early 
decision by the ATS team facilitated the successful upgrade to all 19 devices (reference ECP-
0072-003 6 DOF Motion System). ). The motion system upgrade also drove some unintended 
consequences. Many of the enclosures the trainers were housed in, particularly at Guard and 
reserve units, were converted aircraft hangers and other ―adapted‖ buildings. One such 
consequence of bringing motion to the simulators related to the ―excursion envelope‖ the motion 
system required for the trainer within the facility. In some cases, the facility was a few inches too 
small. In other cases, a new facility was required. Early interaction with local units and the 
detailed engineering studies of the new motion system requirements allowed local MILCON 
budgets to be modified and/or initiated so that the facilities would be ready for the motion 
system. Many times, the timing of when a particular unit would get the motion system was 
adjusted until the building modifications were completed. 
Another example was that adding motion required a reinforced concrete pad. Where hangars and 
facilities were engineered to support the weight of a tanker, little change was needed. However, 
in a few facilities, a reinforced pad was required to ensure the safety of the system and crew so 
that the motion system wouldn‘t rip itself out of the ground during a simulated flight maneuver. 
Again, close interaction between the simulator program office and the host units was usually 
sufficient to align the resources required or to get MILCON to pay for these changes. In a few 
cases, the motion upgrade was delayed until this work could be finished. 
3.4.2 Computer Rehost Program 
In October 1995, the Government requested an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to rehost the 
simulator‘s computer and upgrade the instructor/operator station. The final configuration 
installed an IBM RISC 6000 computer system and SUN Micro based instructor/operator station. 
This ECP upgraded all 19 OFTs. In addition, the contract included an upgrade of the Software 
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Support Center computer at the Altus Training System Support Center (TSSC) as well as options 
for a KC-135 OFT control loading system upgrade and Boom Operator Part Task Trainer 
computer upgrade. The original proposal called for a less capable computer that would barely 
meet requirements over the initial two to three years. During the initial TIM, several questions 
were posed about future memory requirements and processing capabilities by the Government 
chief engineer. Additional questioning garnered acknowledgement that additional potential 
computing issues were likely to unfold within a few years of the upgrade including the 
possibility of a need for future growth to a distributed simulation training capability. Because it 
was determined the original proposal offered minimal spare computing capacity a more capable 
computer with a significantly lower price was obtained.  
Improved instructor performance was also achieved in the OFT by providing a powerful 
graphics-based, multi-display touch screen based instructor station. It was also noted by the team 
that the original graphics generator system was becoming unsupportable. The ATS contractor 
was in fact down to one spare for all 19 OFTs. The contractor was directed to seek an innovative 
way of finding recycled and used projection tubes (CRTs) to bridge the gap until the visual 
system upgrade could be installed, while the government would seek the required funding. As a 
result of the Government‘s decision to obtain the necessary funding for the replacement 
modification a serious parts obsolescence issue was resolved. This is a great example of where 
the system ‗broke down‘ under the normal processes. It wasn‘t until a crisis stage was reached 
that enough momentum was created to motivate finding necessary funds. However, the result 
could be construed as an example of the team‘s proactive systems engineering process of life 
cycle management being correctly applied to an ongoing Air Force-wide issue regarding parts 
obsolescence and/or Diminishing Manufacturing Sources.  
In addition, by incorporating growth requirements into the design process systems engineering 
ensured replacement of the host computer would provide the infrastructure necessary to enable 
future visual system and aerodynamics programming upgrades to the OFT and WST as well as 
providing liberal performance margins for future planned aircraft modifications such as Pacer 
CRAG (Reference ECP-0072-012 Computer System Rehost). It was a combination of the right 
people in the right places at the right time – and the deliberate system ‗big picture‘ perspective 
used by many people involved in the modification. 
3.4.2.1 Third-Party Contracts 
The Computer System Rehost program was awarded as a third party contract outside the purview 
of the current ATS O&M contract.
21
 Although FlightSafety is the prime contractor responsible 
for maintaining and operating the ATS, there have been cases where the government has opted to 
contract with a third party for specific upgrades to the ATS. For those third-party contracts the 
Government Program Office prepares a Request for Proposal (RFP) and conducts a formal 
source selection. Although the prime contractor selected has a system specification and 
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 However, the contractor selected turned out to be Flight Safety International, a member of the same family of 
companies that FSSC belonged to. This decision was fortuitous as the government sought to avoid the overhead cost 
that FSSC would place on the contract for essentially pass-through administrative costs. The government considered 
the risks such an arrangement would bring but felt that by requiring the contractor to enter into an Associate 
Contractor Agreement (ACA) with FSSC, most risks could be mitigated. The fact that the contractor turned out to be 
FSI was serendipitous and the arrangement worked out well. However, such contracting arrangements went counter 
to the TSPR philosophy (which by then had fallen out of favor) and pressure mounted within the program office to 
use alternative arrangements for modifications. Unfortunately, the track record of using other third party contractors 
was not as good as this example. 
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Statement of Work (SOW) for the capability under development. FlightSafety, as the KC-135 
ATS prime contractor, still retained responsibility for meeting overall Air Force training needs.  
It was recognized by all stakeholders that meeting Air Force training requirements was at risk 
without proper involvement by FlightSafety early in the contracted effort. This was a difficult 
problem for FlightSafety particularly in regard to aircraft modifications. Initially the process 
utilized for obtaining the KC-135 ATS prime‘s support, which was basically voluntary, to ensure 
modifications by third-party contractors did not affect their ability to meet student training needs 
varied in scope. In the past, such third-party modifications to the ATS were not thoroughly 
tested, documentation was not in a usable format, interfaces were not well-defined, ATPs needed 
to be properly structured in order to validate performance of the system under development, no 
spares were bought, etc. In addition, maintaining configuration control of the ATS was an issue 
since the ATS prime did not have much of a hammer to ensure documentation/drawings 
provided by third-party contractors was correct and of good quality. There were work-arounds 
available to the Government if the product did in fact impact negatively on training. For 
example, requests for equitable adjustment could be made to incorporate fixes so that training 
needs could be met. For example, a third party contractor added tabletop Multifunctional 
Displays (MFDs), Control Display Unit (CDU), and control panel to one of the training devices 
but the drawings and documentation were lacking so FlightSafety, at the request of the 
Government simulator program office, under a future modification program (Pacer CRAG Block 
40), was contracted to correct the deficiencies.  
As a result of these lessons learned, a more formal process was developed to ensure early 
involvement by the KC-135 ATS prime in the development effort. This first large scale attempt 
at making these arrangements happened during the Pacer CRAG modification. Over time, this 
process of ensuring all stakeholders were properly involved in the development process early on 
has continued to evolve and mature. Frequently, an associate contractor agreement (ACA) 
between the subsystem prime contractor and the KC-135 ATS O&M contractor was typically 
used to support the contract. Later as the process evolved more formal contractual tasking (for 
example, a Performance Work Statement (PWS)) was implemented in order to identify specific 
tasks to be accomplished by the KC-135 ATS prime to ensure training needs continue to be met 
(The IOSS which will be discussed later is an example of this approach).  
3.4.3 Pacer CRAG 
In April 1996, the KC-135 ATS program underwent a comprehensive and complex ECP that 
modified the performance of the KC-135 Operational Flight Trainers to the applicable 
characteristics of the KC-135E/R model aircraft as modified to the Pacer CRAG configuration. 
The government initially asked for a preliminary estimate from FSSC for the cost to incorporate 
the modification into the trainers. The resulting proposal was extremely cost prohibitive. In 
essence, the proposal called for FlightSafety to reverse engineer or use best-guess engineering to 
mimic what was being put into the aircraft. 
The Government program management was aware of previous efforts to incorporate aircraft 
hardware into simulators to avoid the additional engineering costs. The Government engineer 
found an existing commercial standard, ARINC 610, would enable most of the modified aircraft 
hardware to be installed.  
The aircraft SPO approached the prime contractor (Rockwell) for the cost to incorporate the 
standard into their system. The resulting price was orders of magnitude lower than having FSSC 
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engineer a separate solution. Nevertheless, incorporating the ARINC 610 standard was seen as a 
huge risk to the aircraft program. A great deal of discussion was done along with engineering 
analysis by the program office and the prime. Eventually, they saw the risks as acceptable. 
However, getting FSSC to become part of the existing logistics stream and relying upon 
government furnished equipment was seen as a huge risk. After a concerted effort among all 
parties, these concerns were resolved and resulted in a win-win for all parties. Additionally, the 
ATS actually played a larger role in acceptance testing for the aircraft as many unusual and 
potentially dangerous flight modes and configurations could be simulated without risk to an 
aircraft.  
The change included installation of an aircraft glare-shield; aircraft control panels, 
multifunctional displays, a CDU 900B Control Display Unit, and replacement of the existing 
Main Instrument Panel for Pilot and Copilot, as well as simulator software for the new systems. 
In addition, several features were added to the OFTs to improve training utility – for example the 
following features were implemented: flight freeze; lat/long freeze; altitude freeze; and 30 
additional system instructor controlled malfunctions. These features were actually part of the 
ARINC 610 standard and were an additional bonus unanticipated by the decision to use the 
standard. Including these functions, however, was common practice among the commercial 
industry, and not new to the prime contractor (Rockwell) which had already done this for many 
of their commercial airline customers, but this was the first time such things would be included 
in a USAF system. The successful implementation of this standard set the stage for many other 
AMC (and USAF) programs to incorporate this technology into their systems. 
Previously, in 1995, FlightSafety Services conducted a trade study to determine future 
requirements for the Combat Crew Training School (CCTS). That study recommended Computer 
Based Training (CBT) be used more in the CCTS for training students, as well as enhancing 
Instructor-Based Training (IBT) through the use of ―The Animated Classroom‖. FlightSafety 
incorporated the results of that study into the requirements for the Pacer CRAG modification by 
utilizing CBT as the media of choice to introduce students in the CCTS to the new Pacer CRAG 
avionics. FlightSafety developed the appropriate CBT courseware at its Littleton, Colorado, 
facility using the Instructional System Development (ISD) process at the request of the 
government. Both Government Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and FlightSafety instructors from 
the Altus CCTS participated in the courseware development. The Pacer CRAG CBT lessons are 
now being used for both CCTS training and continuation training. 
A Pacer CRAG Part Task Trainer (PTT) was developed to simulate the aircraft system control 
panels and display systems in an existing PC environment. The PTT allowed the student to 
become familiar with the Pacer CRAG system operation and presentations through an interactive 
mode and a tutorial mode without the need of an instructor. The PTT used Commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) software and existing CBT PC computers. This was an interesting development as 
it happened before it became common practice in the commercial world for the original 
equipment maker to develop a windows-based emulator for their terminals. Nevertheless, it 
saved a lot of money and allowed for rapid deployment of training across the ATS. 
As with the CCTS, CBT is used as the medium of choice to introduce qualified KC-135 
crewmembers to the PACER CRAG suite of equipment during continuation training. Once CBT 
lessons are completed, students are authorized to practice on the PTT, fly the OFT, and receive 
aircraft certification. By relying on CBT and PTT as the primary method of instruction, the 
contractor ensures training system concurrency by ensuring all KC-135 units receive Pacer 
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CRAG instruction prior to receiving their first modified aircraft. 
In addition to the hardware and software development efforts associated with Pacer CRAG the 
contractor developed courseware for Initial Qualification, Differences Training, and 
Continuation Training required for the new components of Pacer CRAG for the KC-135. Initial 
Qualification training focuses on students new to the KC-135; Differences Training focuses on 
pilots and copilots that are current in the KC-135 and are transitioning to the glass cockpit KC-
135; Continuation Training is part of the crewmember‘s annual training. This was a great 
collaborative effort identified through the discussions of the TSCWG, Government personnel in 
the ATS program office, the command, and the contractor and otherwise would have been 
missed…everyone assumed that the modifications would happen quickly and everyone would be 
trained the right way. But the reality of the situation was much harder and collaboration between 
the various groups was a key to their success. (Reference ECP-0072-014R1 Pacer CRAG) 
3.4.4 Visual Upgrade Effort (VUE) 
The next major upgrade occurred in January 1997 with the Government issuing an Engineering 
Change Proposal to upgrade the OFT visual system. The upgrade was driven by limited field of 
view (FOV) issues, lack of FAA Level C Certification, and lack of cockpit cross visualization 
capability that was determined to be required to provide the capability needed for training the 
task of aerial refueling.  
The VUE program replaced the KC-135R OFT night/dusk Novoview SP-1 visual system with a 
high brightness, high resolution, wide FOV, day/night/dusk visual system. The SP1T was a wide 
area collimated (WAC) window system with four windows. One window each was located on 
the front and side for the pilot and a similar configuration for the copilot. The system did not 
allow for cross window coherence. Under this effort, the SP-1 was replaced by an ESIG 4530 
five channel image generator (IG), which drives five Thomson Phebus V color projectors to 
produce a continuous 225 degree horizontal by 45 degree FOV. The visual system was designed 
to meet FAA AC 120-40B Level C requirements as well as provide enhanced capabilities and 
sufficient fidelity to enable aircrew members to log currency credit for such maneuvers as 
takeoffs, landings, circling approaches, visual approaches, and certain air refueling related 
maneuvers such as air refueling formation and receiver rendezvous. A major requirement was 
also that the visual system support KC-135R asymmetric thrust, engine-out training since there 
was no motion on the existing OFT. The normal initial cue for asymmetric thrust would be from 
motion. Without motion the visual system must provide the initial cues using a large horizontal 
FOV. The enhanced thrust of the KC-130R engines magnified the urgency of engine out reaction 
time training.  
3.4.4.1 Context of VUE Program 
The VUE program was awarded as a third party contract outside the purview of the current ATS 
O&M contract. The visual system, which included the IG, display systems, and all 
parts/components required to adapt the new VUE system to the KC-135R OFTs, was delivered 
to FlightSafety Services as Government-Furnished Product (GFP) to be installed and integrated 
onto the 19 KC-135 Operational Flight Trainers.  
The strategy of the VUE program was to capitalize upon economies of scale afforded by having 
the government purchase additional systems tailored to different platforms. The strategy, 
conceived and managed by the 677
th
 Training System Product Group, was to conduct a 
combined acquisition featuring a core visual system that would go on to the KC-135 OFTs as 
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well as the KC-10 Simulators. The RFP for the VUE highlighted the government‘s desire to 
leverage ―commercial best practices.‖  
There were several technology risks that played a larger role in the modification than the 
Government realized at the time. First, the technology for cross-window coherent, wide field-of-
view visual systems existed, but had never been scaled to the dimensions required to support air 
refueling and engine out requirements. The contractor was confident this could be done quite 
easily and convinced the government team during source selection. The SE Requirements 
allocation process failed to identify this as a risk and assumptions were made about the capacity 
of the motion platforms for both the KC-135 as well as the KC-10 simulators. 
These technical issues, combined with those arising from the differences between the two 
simulator systems, caused severe schedule delays in delivery to the Government. These delays 
had negative impacts upon FSSC maintenance and other ECPs as installation schedules were in a 
lot of flux trying to minimize training impacts across the ATS. Although consideration was given 
to the Government by the VUE contractor, significant impacts were felt across the ATS.  
3.4.4.2 KC-135 ATS Contractor Role 
As part of the VUE Installation and Integration (I&I) effort, FlightSafety was formally tasked to 
support the VUE contractor in their design effort and to assist the Government in factory 
acceptance testing. In addition, FlightSafety was tasked to conduct a trade study to investigate 
additional training capabilities gained by the new day/night 225 degree wide FOV visual system. 
Specifically they were to investigate training utility of the OFT in the areas of training day/night 
landings, circling approaches, and visual/radar cell procedures during air refueling formation 
flight and update formal CCTS and continuation training in order to benefit from this increased 
training capability provided by the VUE system. The new system allowed reuse of the Evans & 
Sutherland (E&S) airfield data from their library of databases. Requirements existed for certain 
airfields but E&S supplied additional ones for compensation consideration for being late on 
schedule. A separate database generation system (DBGS) develops, integrates, and maintains the 
VUE databases under a separate contract. 
For this effort an Associate Contractor Agreement (ACA) was signed between FlightSafety and 
the VUE contractor to facilitate the exchange of data and information to support the design, 
integration, operational and logistic support of the VUE installations on the OFTs.
22
 Specifically 
this ACA addressed such FlightSafety specific tasks as attending and assisting the Government 
at: VUE technical and program management reviews, Contractor Engineering Validation Tests 
(CEVT), Joint Ready to Ship Assessments (JRSA), and Functional Configuration Audit/Physical 
Configuration Audit (FCA/PCA). In addition FlightSafety was to support the VUE contractor in 
accomplishing VUE visual system to KC-135 interface design; evaluate impact of the visual 
system installation design on the OFT facilities; sponsor and arrange access to KC-135 OFTs and 
data as requested by the VUE contractor; ensure visual system to OFT integration allowed full 
operation of all required VUE system features; prepare an ATP that fully tests the VUE system 
as installed and integrated with the OFT; and conduct final acceptance testing on the installed 
visual system. Although Ogden and FlightSafety were involved in all design reviews the O&M 
contractor was a non-voting participant. Ogden and FlightSafety were only able to offer their 
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 Unfortunately, having an ACA in place does not guarantee a cordial working relationship. The VUE contractor 
saw FSSC as a direct competitor since it belonged to the same family of companies the VUE contractor competed 
against, e.g. Flight Safety International. 
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opinions and concerns. After receiving initial cadre training on the VUE system, the FlightSafety 
was to provide operations and maintenance training to site personnel; revise CCTS and 
continuation training courseware as necessary to make optimum use of the new system 
capabilities; and perform configuration management of the installed visual systems over the life 
cycle of the ATS to ensure uniform configuration. (Reference ECP-0072-018 Visual Upgrade 
Effort)  
As a part of the VUE prime contractor‘s systems engineering process, the contractor was 
responsible for allocating functional requirements down to the subsystem level and verifying that 
system‘s performance against an Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP), which they developed and 
the Government approved. The systems engineering process followed by the team resulted in 
several success stories. For example, to ensure a common design and minimize impacts resulting 
from PO/DMS issues state-of-the-art chip design was specified for many of the subsystems 
comprising the VUE. The design approach specified required the system to be designed around a 
family of chips that were essentially backward and forward compatible. This commonality of 
design aided the support system contractor in maintaining system concurrency. In fact, when 
some memory chips became obsolete on the 4530 before all IGs were delivered the contractor 
was able to deliver the remaining IGs with a new 5530 configuration and upgrade the delivered 
4530s to 5530 configuration at minimal cost to the government.  
3.4.4.3 Lessons Learned 
One of the shortfalls with the systems engineering process identified by the team employed on 
the VUE program specifically addressed the requirements process. There was no formal Systems 
Engineering process followed for requirements allocation. The mantra of using ―best commercial 
practices‖ was now well entrenched across the defense industry and the phrase ―best commercial 
practices‖ had been at that time interpreted to mean using the contractor‘s internal processes, 
without regard to their ―goodness‖ or not. The key issue is to make sure all requirements are 
adequately defined early in the development phase, that they reflect obtainable characteristics, 
and that the dialogue that must occur between Government program engineers, the contractors, 
and the user covers all potential performance requirements and sustainment issues. Since there 
was no formal requirements process, this did not happen. For example, extreme visual system 
field boundary limit physics did not support the design collimation requirements as stated by the 
Government. The Government was not aware of these issues until well after the contractor had 
done significant work on the system and concluded that the requirement could not actually be 
met (despite the fact that this was a risk identified from the beginning by the source selection 
team). Collimation is defined as the act of making a beam of light parallel by a suitable 
arrangement of lenses or mirrors (a collimator). Convergence and divergence rays of light need 
to focus on the eye plus-or-minus a range and the outer edges as specified exceeded this 
tolerance allowance. This resulted in the need to relax the collimation requirement. Failure in this 
area struck at one of the primary or core issues behind the official need for the visual system 
upgrade---to allow cross-cockpit visual system cues for in-flight refueling and meeting the 
requirements for Level C. In addition, there was no requirement in the System Requirements 
Document (SRD) for auto alignment of the visual system. The need for auto-alignment is derived 
from the fact that the shaking and movement of the motion platform would eventually knock the 
system out of alignment and result in a degraded visual sight picture. This capability, which 
would have reduced the amount of manual alignments required to maintain the system‘s 
performance had a direct effect on the sustainment of the visual system, was identified too late in 
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the design process and incorporating such a capability at that time would have a significant cost 
and schedule impact
23
.  
3.4.5 Aerodynamic Upgrade Enhancement (AUE) 
In addition to hardware modifications, extensive work needed to be done to improve the 
aerodynamic models of the simulators. The C-141, C-5, and C-17 aerodynamic simulation 
models already met (or were in the process of meeting) the FAA Level C equivalent requirement, 
but the KC-135 and KC-10 did not. In addition, none of the command‘s trainers had high quality 
aerial refueling simulation models. To deal with this problem the command undertook an 
extensive flight data-gathering program. Seven aircraft (two KC-135Rs, two KC-10As, a C-17, a 
C-5, and a C-141) were flown at Edwards AFB in a two-year data gathering effort. During this 
time, these aircraft flew over 1000 test hours gathering the necessary data. In addition to the 
basic data required for FAA certification of simulators, aerial refueling data was gathered for all 
tanker and receiver combinations.  
3.4.5.1 Context of AUE Program 
The AUE followed the same acquisition strategy and design as the VUE program. The 677
th
 
Training System Product Group managed this program and the KC-135 and KC-10 simulator 
program offices at Ogden and the ATS contractors were tangentially involved in the effort as 
described below. 
In July 1997, the KC-135 ATS program initiated an AUE program to upgrade the existing OFTs 
to meet the fidelity requirements of FAA AC 120-40B Level C. Flight Safety International at 
Tulsa assisted the Air Force in determining what testing needed to be done during the initial data 
gathering phase of the program. Tulsa took the raw data collected during the flight test and using 
models developed by Coleman Industries 
24
modified applicable software packages used in the 
OFT simulator. Typical KC-135 OFT software packages address such aircraft system functions 
as avionics, engine, control forces, lighting, radios, etc. The packages most affected by the AUE 
program were the aero and engine packages. The motion system was also impacted. The data 
package was then delivered to FlightSafety Services Corporation to integrate into the KC-135 
ATS.  
The O&M contractor (FlightSafety) was tasked to install the AUE into the KC-135R OFT and 
update the product baseline and technical publications managed by the KC-135 ATS Training 
System Support Center (TSSC). FlightSafety validated the models based on the flight test data 
and company subject matter experts then subjectively verified the simulator when the new 
software updates ―reacted and felt good.‖  
3.4.5.2 Systems Engineering Issues 
To the systems engineer this issue of subjective testing has been an ongoing simulator dilemma. 
Even when instrumented aircraft data is collected, the modeling use of data extrapolation and 
curve fitting, while being representative of the aircraft, does not exactly replicate the aircraft 
―feel.‖ The contractor does specify quantitatively many requirements in the system/subsystem 
specifications for each modification, such as, for the Visual System upgrade, resolution and 
brightness, shadows, antennas, and hinge lines. But, in the end, the model must be correct 
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 The unintended consequence of this oversight was that the original system only required one hour per week for 
alignment but the VUE system requires up to 3 hours per week or more for alignment activities. 
24
 The AUE contractor 
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enough to allow training, which means it‘s a judgment call by the test crews and Air Force 
instructors about the system‘s training value. It has proven extremely difficult for systems 
engineers to quantitatively specify this training value. No matter how much experience a team 
has quantifying and measuring simulator performance, in reality it remains a qualitative 
assessment as to the realism of the simulator. The Air Force has typically had the user identify 
what the Air Force used to call a ―golden arm‖ to provide the official acceptance and tweak the 
system to provide close to realistic refinement. Sometimes groups of multiple pilots are used to 
get a consensus for the adjustments. While this approach can work, it can sometimes lead to 
extended test periods without conclusive results especially when Government personnel continue 
to change while the system undergoes validation. While each aircraft has its differences the idea 
is to get the simulator as close to an aircraft feel as possible. The approach taken by the KC-135 
ATS team was ensure consistency of the evaluation process by utilizing one to two contractor 
instructor pilots and one Air Force instructor pilot to provide this qualitative assessment of the 
system‘s training value (reference ECP-0072-021 Aerodynamic Upgrade Enhancement) .  
3.4.6 Pacer CRAG Block 40 
In August 2001, the Government initiated a modification program to address changes required to 
reconfigure the existing 19 KC-135R OFTs in order to maintain concurrency with the KC-135 
aircraft which was undergoing an upgrade to the Pacer CRAG Block 40 configuration. These 
aircraft changes included the addition of the Global Air Traffic management (GATM) 
modifications. The major aircraft modifications encompassed three main areas: A 
Communication Management Function (CMF) which manages a Controller-Pilot Data Link 
system that supports data communications for the Air Traffic Services including both Line Of 
Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) surveillance; Improvements to the Navigation 
system to meet the requirements of Required Navigation Performance (RNP)-4 and below; and 
Improvements to the Surveillance capability by implementing Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Addressed (ADS0A) operational capability with growth to ADS-B (Broadcast) 
capability. 
The OFT modifications included, in addition to the aircraft driven changes, a replacement host 
computer system, the capability to emulate the Block 40 ground station network to support 
Controller Pilot Datalink Communications training, including an off board operator station, 
modified Instructor Operator Station (IOS) controls, and, as an option, equipment and software 
to enable the OFT to be configured as either a Block 30 or a Block 40 configuration. 
Comprehensive systems engineering requirements were detailed out in a SOW to both the ATS 
prime contractor FlightSafety and the KC-135 Pacer CRAG Block 40 prime contractor. A key 
requirement which led to the success of the program was to hold a combined post-award 
conference and System Requirements Review within 30 days of contract award for the purpose 
of jointly reviewing the SOW, Development Specifications, and other requirements to ensure 
that both the Government and Contractor personnel from the ATS and KC-135 Pacer CRAG 
teams had reached a level of mutual expectations and understanding of requirements. With Block 
40 (mid-2000s), everyone was already familiar with the arrangement of simulator code in flight 
qualified hardware. With this increasing trust between simulation providers and the aircraft SPO, 
these arrangements were easily facilitated. In addition to jointly participating in the KC-135 
Pacer CRAG design reviews to ensure training requirements were identified early in the Pacer 
CRAG development cycle, a Required Assets Available Review was held to ensure all 
Discrepancy Reports, which directly impact training, had been cleared or a mitigation plan 
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approved.  
This contract also provides some insight into the KC-135 ATS team‘s evolving systems 
engineering approach to managing the training system. Regarding the KC-135 Block 40 upgrade 
which was developed by Rockwell-Collins, FlightSafety sent instructors and maintenance 
personnel to Rockwell-Collins in order to obtain specific Block 40 Type 1 Training as well as 
attending all of their design reviews to ensure they (FlightSafety) understood fully how the 
system was intended to function on the aircraft. By working closely with Rockwell-Collins 
during this early phase of development the ATS team ensured simulator specific needs were 
addressed in the aircraft design. For example, Rockwell-Collins modified the aircraft software to 
incorporate software ―hooks‖ that were needed to facilitate training system development thereby 
ensuring the fielding of a Block 40 configured training device before aircraft arriving on the 
ramp. The incorporation of software hooks into a design is a technique used to alter or augment 
the behavior of an operating system or application, often without having access to its source 
code. In the flight simulator arena the application of hooks into the aircraft‘s operational flight 
software allows the training system to easily incorporate such simulator unique functions as 
freeze frame or halting the simulation and return to a previous state of simulation such as 
repositioning the aircraft on final to repeat a landing sequence. This is the essence of the ARINC 
610 standard. Rockwell-Collins made these modifications because they were on contract to do so 
and FlightSafety was prepared to offer assistance because they were on contract to do so. 
Furthermore, the terms of the existing contract still stood, so FlightSafety was motivated to 
ensure the system would work properly so they could still train and ―graduate‖ students when 
they successfully passed their aircraft check ride. 
As a part of the Block 40 program, a FlightSafety systems engineer recognized a potential issue 
associated with the future operation and maintenance of Block 40 configured OFTs at multiple 
KC-135 bases and as a result initiated a program requirement for system reconfiguration. Since 
modifying aircraft from a Block 30 configuration to a Block 40 configuration involved major 
changes to the aircraft and ATS, systems engineering‘s assessment was that a scheduling 
nightmare might occur given the uncertainty of which bases and which batch of aircraft would 
get the Block 40 modification. Their derived requirement for system convertibility, which was 
flowed down to their subcontractors, was to be able to convert a Block 30 simulator to a Block 
40 configuration in eight hours by two people in order to maintain the required training schedule 
and student throughput. The actual conversion takes less than four hours today and is a main 
contributor to the OFT‘s availability for training. (Reference ECP-0072-031 ATS Block 40 
Upgrade)  
3.4.7 Distributed Mission Operations 
In 1996, General Fogleman, AMC/CC issued a message ―Revolutionizing Training.‖ The 
message urged the major commands to develop a joint synthetic training environment utilizing 
simulators, networking, and other technologies. Shortly thereafter, the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Acquisition and Technology (USD /A&T) Mr. Paul Kaminski published a memorandum 
which mandated that all simulators comply with high level architecture (HLA), a structure for 
networking simulations. In response to this direction AMC began programs to develop 
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Distributed Mission Training (DMT) capabilities for all its simulators. Nevertheless, the 
technology for implementing DMT capability was not yet mature at this time
25
. 
In 2004, the KC-135 ATS program initiated a phased approach for achieving a virtual 
environment for integrated cooperative training.
26
 This phased approach, which runs concurrent 
with but is not considered a part of the ATS upgrade program, started with an initial 
demonstration of the feasibility and potential of such a distributed mission training capability at 
Altus. This capability, which the KC-135 ATS program refers to as Distributed Mission 
Operations (DMO), was completed in August 22, 2005. A key element in achieving this 
capability was the necessity for the program to achieve an HLA certification of Compliance from 
the Director, Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, which was obtained on June 2, 2005 
Following this demonstration, the capability was expanded to McConnell AFB. This DMO 
capability allowed any trainer at the site to operate while hearing and seeing other co-located 
trainers flying in the same training environment. In essence, the simulators are linked such that 
aircrews operating them can communicate with each other and, in conjunction with state-of-the-
art visual systems, practice formation flying. The next step in the plan was to link Altus with 
McConnell expanding the virtual battle-space to include geographically separate areas yet having 
the sites close enough to facilitate debugging of the system and then in FY2007 the capability 
was expanded to include both Fairchild and Grand Forks AFBs. In FY2009 the two Boom 
Operator Weapon System Trainers located at Altus will be integrated with the OFTs providing a 
DMO capability at the schoolhouse.
27 
3.4.8 Instructor Operator Station System 
This effort was awarded in December 2007 when the Government awarded a third-party contract 
to upgrade the Instructor Operator Station System (IOSS). This third-party contractor was tasked 
to essentially replace the current IOS computational system, the dual IOS displays, and the 
remote control unit in each of the 19 OFTs. The goal of this program was to minimize OFT 
downtime and attendant training throughput.  
A Contract Change Proposal (CCP) was issued to FlightSafety, the O&M contractor that 
described the activities required by them in support of the IOSS contractor. Their primary role 
was to provide supplementary integration support for the IOSS replacement via design review 
and technical/testing assistance support to the IOSS contractor as required by the SOW. In this 
CCP, FlightSafety was tasked specifically to support a Systems Requirements Review, 
Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, review all design documents, assist the IOSS 
contractor in integrating the new data package into the current data library, coordinate with the 
IOSS contractor during equipment installation and testing, assist with the Physical Configuration 
Audit, provide test personnel and assistance for the contractor and government acceptance tests, 
and provide test pilots and instructor personnel for subject matter expert support to the IOSS 
contractor. In addition, FlightSafety would receive maintenance training from the IOSS 
contractor and FlightSafety TSSC software engineers would receive training on the new IOSS 
development system. (Reference CCP-0072-265 IOSS)  
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 The online gaming industry spurred most of the technological developments and breakthroughs required to make 
DMT a realistic venture. 
26
 The long pole associated with the implementation of a DMO capability within the KC-135 ATS program was 
limited funding. 
27
 AMC proposes, based on achieving DMO capability, to transfer 50% of pilot formation training (over 1200 flying 
hours per year) into simulators with a potential cost avoidance of approximately $2.7M based on FY06 O&M rate. 
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To ensure adequacy of documentation for the IOS modification, FlightSafety established a 
technical manual validation program for the modification technical manuals in accordance with 
existing KC-135 ATS plans. The IOSS contractor was required to validate all data provided to 
support the modification. Validation was to occur in an environment which closely duplicates 
that in which the equipment and documentation will be used, i.e., in-plant as a pre-delivery 
prototype or on-site during prototype acceptance. Technical manual validation was to be 
accomplished prior to prototype RAAR(s). If commercial manuals or portions thereof were 
provided that have already been validated or proven by use, the IOSS contractor was to certify 
the existing commercial manuals and data as ―current and accurate.‖  
3.5 KC-135 E/R ATS Follow-on Activities 
Follow-on contractual efforts (Post 2010) are planned to focus on incorporating a true 
Distributed Mission Training (DMT) capability which will provide the KC-135 ATS with a fully 
interactive system utilizing state-of-the-art simulation technology to permit KC-135 aircrews to 
train in synthetic battle-space connected electronically to other KC-135 OFTs and aircrews at 
other dispersed sites operating different aircraft types such as the C-5 and C-17. Importantly, 
since DMT provides the capability to deliver this enhanced training from the home station, the 
Air Force believes they can now limit the amount of time airmen spend deployed and facilitate 
the training of USAF air-expeditionary forces as they prepare for deployment to global crisis 
zones. In addition, AMC ATS priorities include replacing all visual systems that are currently 
high maintenance items and add a Boom Operator Weapon System Trainer (BOWST) capability 
at all active duty bases. 
4. Summary 
From its beginning in the early 1960s as mobile KC-135 simulators housed in railroad cars the 
KC-135 ATS has evolved into an effective ground-based aircrew training system while 
achieving a high level of customer acceptance and approval. In order to realize the goal of 
increased usage of the ATS for crew training, several key elements needed to be in place: a 
cultural change was made within the Air Force tanker community in that effective training is 
achievable by effective use of ground based trainers; money was allocated to effectively operate, 
maintain, and upgrade ATS capabilities; corresponding improvements to the hardware and 
software were realized in a cost-effective manner; good relationships between the Government 
and Contractors have been established and maintained; a competent Government and Contractor 
team was formed; common goals associated with the development and operation of an effective 
and efficient training system were established (i.e., emphasizing ATS upgrades to be completed 
prior to aircraft modifications being fielded); and an effective systems engineering process was 
put in place.  
What drove the requirement for a structured SE process was the need for the contractor to ensure 
a consistent level of training is provided to the Air Force. Specifically ensuring all courseware, 
documentation, hardware, and software is sufficient to provide training value. For example, in 
the area of courseware, there are now formal SOWs and specifications specifically addressing 
courseware development. There is currently a requirement to show traceability back to these 
baseline requirements, trace lessons back to their source data (Technical Orders (TOs), Time 
Critical Technical Orders (TCTO)s, Safety Bulletins), and all courseware must be documented 
and sanctioned by the Government.  
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One of the key processes employed by the team is rigorous design reviews, including 
participating in the OEM‘s design reviews so that the training community is working in parallel 
with the aircraft community. As an example, regarding the Block 40 upgrade which was 
developed by Rockwell-Collins for the KC-135, the ATS prime contractor actually took Block 
40 (CNS/ATM) Type 1 training as well as attended all of their design reviews to ensure they 
(FlightSafety) understood fully how the system was intended to function on the aircraft and, by 
working closely with the OEM during this phase of development, ensure simulator specific needs 
were being addressed in the aircraft design. As a result of this close interaction early in the 
system‘s development phase Rockwell-Collins was able to modify the aircraft software to 
incorporate software ―hooks‖ which are needed to facilitate meeting aircrew training 
requirements. The team‘s success is also due to their ability to be flexible and react quickly to 
customer needs.  
Achieving the user‘s mandate to maintain training concurrent with the aircraft, supporting a very 
active operations tempo (large numbers of students) with approximately 75 percent comprised of 
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command aircrews without access to on-site flight 
trainers, ongoing Base Relocation and Consolidation (BRAC) initiatives, which have resulted in 
various changes in operating site locations, and an impetus to move training from the aircraft to 
the ATS/simulator, will continue to present new challenges. 
Part of the reason for the effectiveness of the KC-135 ATS upgrade program is the simulator 
team has, over a period of 17 years, evolved into a very effective organization. One of the 
challenges facing the Government in 2010, when the current contract is recompeted, will be to 
foster the advantages associated with long-term support contracts (i.e., workforce continuity, 
knowledgeable support personnel, program stability, sense of ownership, incentives for process 
improvements, incentive for long-range planning) while meeting the Government‘s requirements 
for increased competition and shorter term contracts.  
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Appendix A. Author Biographies 
Donald Chislaghi 
Mr. Chislaghi has over 39 years of engineering experience in the research, development, and 
acquisition of aeronautical systems. He has served as Director of Engineering, B-1; Chief, Crew 
Systems Engineering Division; and Chief Support Systems Engineer, Advanced Tactical 
Fighter/F-22 and AWACS program. As Director of Engineering for the B-1B program he led a 
team comprised of over 100 engineers from both WPAFB and Tinker AFB. As Chief, Crew 
Systems Division he led a team of over 200 specialists responsible for the design of advanced 
cockpits, life support equipment, escape systems, Pilot/Vehicle Interfaces, and cargo handling 
systems. As Chief Support Systems Engineer for the F-22 he led a team of over 30 engineers and 
training system Subject Matter Experts responsible for the design and development of advanced 
crew systems, training systems, and support systems. He has also held the position of System 
Safety Engineer within both ASC Engineering and the 4950
th
 Test Wing. In this latter position he 
had responsibility for safety sign-off of all Class II (T-1) modifications. During his assignment to 
the 4950
th
 Test Wing, and in addition to his system safety duties, Mr. Chislaghi held the position 
of aircraft structural design engineer responsible for the modification of test wing aircraft. He has 
successfully designed modifications to fighters, helicopters, bombers, cargo, and trainer type 
aircraft. 
As a Senior Systems Engineer for MacAulay Brown, Mr. Chislaghi is responsible for the 
analysis, planning, and integration of new or upgraded weapons and other subsystems to DoD 
aircraft. He supports ASC weapon system program offices and prime integrating contractors in 
all phases of acquisition. In addition to direct support to such programs as Global Hawk, CSAR, 
Gunship, P-3A, and WASP, he has been selected to support several independent review teams as 
a Subject Matter Expert in the area of airworthiness certification. He also led the development of 
a graduate level Systems Engineering course for AFIT in which he designed and developed a 
case study specifically to demonstrate the process for analyzing schedule risk assessments 
utilizing Integrated Master Schedules and tools such as Risk+. 
EDUCATION 
Master of Science, Engineering Management, University of Dayton, 
Dayton, Ohio, 1983. 
Bachelor of Science, Aeronautical Engineering, Indiana Institute of Technology, 
Fort Wayne, Indiana, 1968. 
AWARDS 
Meritorious Civilian Service Award, 1992 
Air Force Materiel Command Outstanding Chief Engineer Award, 1998 
Outstanding Civilian Career Service Award, 2002 
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Richard Dyer 
Mr. Dyer has over 40 years of engineering experience in the research, development, and 
acquisition of aeronautical systems. Dick Dyer joined MacAulay Brown, Inc. as a Senior 
Systems Engineer in 2003, providing flight systems, airworthiness and systems engineering 
support to government weapon systems program offices and airframe prime contractors. He is 
responsible for the analyzing, planning, and integrating aircraft weapons systems and 
subsystems. As a Senior Systems Engineer, Mr. Dyer has reviewed and developed numerous 
program System Engineering Plans and has been name requested to perform independent 
reviews of DoD program Integrated Master Plans and Schedules (IMP/IMS). He also led the 
MacAulay Brown Systems Engineering and Airworthiness effort to return the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) Widebody Airborne Sensor Platform (WASP) aircraft back to operational 
service.  
Prior to his employment at MacAulay Brown, Mr. Dyer served as Technical Director, Flight 
Systems Division in the Engineering Directorate of the Aeronautical Systems Center, and as 
Chief Engineer and Chief Flight Systems Engineer for the B-2 bomber. He has personally led 
many independent airworthiness safety review assessments on Air Force systems e.g., CV-22, B-
2, A-10, F-35 and F-22. He personally led the Aeronautical Systems Center Engineering 
Directorate‘s efforts to produce the Air Force Airworthiness Certification Criteria published in 
Mar 2000. This document became the foundation for the Department of Defense (DoD) criteria 
published as a military handbook (Mil HDBK 516) which standardizes airworthiness criteria for 
all DoD fixed wing aircraft. Mr. Dyer is a resident expert for airworthiness/safety assessments of 
military aircraft. 
EDUCATION 
Bachelor of Science: Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering, 1968 
Master of Science:  
Aeronautical Engineering, The Ohio State University (OSU), Columbus, Ohio, 1975  
Engineering Management for University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, in 1981. 
AWARDS 
DoD Exceptional Civilian Service Award for leading the Joint Strike Fighter Concept 
Demonstrator Aircraft Independent Review team for airworthiness flight clearance - 25 Sept 01 
EN Director‘s Award for Outstanding Achievement - Sept 01  
DoD Award Defense Certification of Recognition for Acquisition Innovation (Joint Service 
Specification Guides) - 8 Jun 99 
Air Force Exemplary Civilian Service Award B-2 Chief Engineer – 25 May 99 
Senior Scientist of the Year – Flight Dynamics Laboratory Director‘s Award – 1982 
KC-135 Simulator Systems Engineering Case Study   
 
ID 8845 Page A-3 
 
Jay Free 
Mr. Free joined MacAulay-Brown, Inc. as a Senior Systems Engineer in 2002, providing systems 
engineering and training system support to government and industry clients. He has over 38 
years of engineering and management experience in acquisition and sustainment of Air Force 
weapon systems. While working at MacAulay Brown, he has conducted several research studies 
for the KC-X Program Office, co-led development of the HC/MC-130 Cost Analysis 
Requirements Document, provided modification support to the AC-130 Gunship program and 
supported other program activities.  
Prior to his employment at MacAulay Brown, Mr. Free spent 32 years at the Aeronautical 
Systems Center (ASC), Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio supporting simulator and aircraft 
acquisition. Early accomplishments included participation in the development of a prototype 
Digital Radar Landmass Simulator (Project 1183), radar and test engineer of the C-130 Full 
Mission Simulator and lead engineer on the B-52/KC-135 and EF-111 Weapon System Trainers. 
As Technical Chief of the ASC/EN Radar and Visual Simulation Branch he was responsible for 
20 engineers supporting all simulator programs where he also led the Tanker Transport Training 
System (T-1A) simulator source selection. He then served as Chief of the ASC Engineering 
Documents Division where he provided ASC leadership of the Acquisition Reform Program, 
started in 1994 under Secretary of Defense William Perry, and supported the development of 
performance based specifications. Following this he served as Chief Systems Engineer for the 
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS), T-6A Texan II, where he completed his DoD 
career.  
EDUCATION 
 
Bachelor of Science, Systems Engineering, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio, 1970 
AWARDS 
Outstanding Civilian Career Service Award, 2002 
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Appendix B. Acronym List 
 
AC  Advisory Circular 
ACA Associate Contractor Agreement 
ACIQ Aircraft Commander Initial Qualification 
ADS0A Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Addressed  
AETC  Air Education & Training Command 
AFIT  Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFMSS  Air Force Mission Support System 
AMC  Air Mobility Command 
AMCAOS  AMC Air Operations Squadron 
ATD  aircrew training device 
ATP  Acceptance Test Procedures 
ATS  Aircrew Training System 
AUE  Aerodynamic Update Enhancements 
BLOS Beyond Line Of Sight  
BOPTT  Boom Operator Part Task Trainers 
BRAC  Base Relocation and Consolidation 
CBT  Computer Based Training 
CCTS  Combat Crew Training School 
CDR  Critical Design Review 
CEVT  Contractor Engineering Validation Tests  
CFT  Cockpit Familiarization Trainers 
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations 
CLT  Cargo Loading Trainer 
CM  Configuration Management 
CMF Communication Management Function  
CPT  Cockpit Procedures Trainer  
CSE  Center for Systems Engineering 
CT  continuation training 
CW  courseware 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
DBGS  database generation system 
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DMO  Distributed Mission Operation  
DMS  Diminishing Manufacturing Sources  
DMT  Distributed Mission Training 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DODAF  DoD Architectural Framework 
DR  Discrepancy Report  
EIA Electronics Industrial Association 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
FAR  Federal Aviation Regulation 
FMT  Functional Mission Tests  
FlightSafety  FlightSafety Services Corporation 
FTU  Formal Training Unit  
GATM  global air traffic management 
GIPTT  GATM IHC Part Task Trainers 
INCOSE  International Council on Systems Engineering 
I&I  Installation and Integration  
IBT  Instructor-Based Training 
IMP Integrated Master Plan 
IMS Integrated Master Schedule  
IOS  Instructor Operator Station 
IOSS Instructor Operator Station System  
IPR  In-Process Reviews  
IPT  Integrated Product Team 
ISD  Instructional System Development  
JRSA Joint Ready to Ship Assessments 
LOS  Line Of Sight  
MOA  memorandum of agreement 
MOE  Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP  Measures of Performance 
MTL  Master Task List 
O&M  Operations and Maintenance 
OFT  Operational Flight Trainers 
PCA  Physical Configuration Audit  
KC-135 Simulator Systems Engineering Case Study   
 
ID 8843 Page B-3 
 
PDR  Preliminary Design Review 
PIDS Prime Item Development Specification 
PO  Parts Obsolescence  
RAAR  Required Assets Available Review 
RFT  Ready For Training 
RNP Required Navigation Performance  
RTP  Requirement Traceability Program  
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SDRL Subcontractor Data Requirements List 
SEMP Systems Engineering Master Plan  
SIMCERT  Simulator Certification 
SIMSPO  Simulator System Program Office 
SME  Subject Matter Experts 
SoS  system-of-systems 
SOW Statement of Work 
SRD  System Requirements Document  
SRR  Systems Requirements Review 
T&E  Test and Evaluation  
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TIM  Technical Interchange Meeting 
TMS  Training Management System 
TSCWG  Training System Configuration Working Group 
TSPR  Total System Performance Responsibility  
TRR  Test Readiness Review  
TSSC training system support center  
USD (A&T)  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
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Appendix C. OFT Bases 
 
KC-135 OFT Base Locations 
  
Quantity/Type  1992  # 2008 
1-KC-135A OFT Castle AFB 1 Mildenhall 
1-KC-135R OFT Grand Forks 2 Grand Forks 
3-KC-135R OFT Castle AFB 3 Altus 
1-KC-135A OFT Plattsburg 4 McConnell 
1-KC-135R OFT Kadena 5 Kadena 
1-KC-135A OFT Beale  6 Grissom 
1-KC-135A OFT Carswell 7 March 
1-KC-135R OFT Fairchild 8 Fairchild 
1-KC-135R OFT Malmstrom 9 Pease 
1-KC-135R OFT Dyess  10 McConnell 
1-KC-135R OFT Meridian 11 Meridian 
1-KC-135A OFT Altus  12 Altus 
1-KC-135R OFT Grissom 13 Robbins/Scott 
1-KC-135R OFT Robins  14 Altus 
1-KC-135R OFT Barksdale 15 Fairchild 
1-KC-135R OFT Ellsworth 16 G Forks/McConnel 
1-KC-135R OFT Griffis  17 Milwaukee 
     18 Altus 
     19 MacDill 
1992 Base locations were identified from the 1992 Support Service Contract Appendix C 
F33657-91-C-0072. 
2008 Base locations were identified from the Nov 2008 SRB briefing. 
 
